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To ensure the safety of older pesticides used in the United States, the EPA required 
the reregistration of pesticide uses which were first introduced before 1984. Using a 
dataset of reregistration outcomes for 2722 pesticide uses applied to food crops, I 
analyze the extent to which these decisions were determined by chronic health risks, 
pesticide expenditures, and other factors.  I find that the dietary health risks 
associated with pesticides are had greater influence on actions to reduce dietary and 
occupational exposures than on pesticide cancellations. 
High population dietary risks are associated with higher rates of pesticid  
cancellations, though these results are insignificant. There is evidence that the EPA 
was more responsive to child and infant dietary risks: values above the EPA’s 
threshold of concern were more than 10% more likely to be cancelled than those that 
  
were not (significant at the 10% level). The effects of cancer risks on EPA actions are 
more ambiguous, though this may be due to data limitations.  
The less safe pesticides are for handlers, the more often they are cancelled, but 
pesticide safety has a more significant correlation with reentry itervals. A one 
percent decrease in the safety of a pesticide to handlers predicts a reduction in reentry 
interval of 1.6 days (significant at the 5% level).  
 Expenditures on individual pesticides have a strong relationship with pesticide 
reregistration, with an additional half million dollars in expenditures predicting a 2% 
increase in the probability of reregistration (significant at the 1% level). Expenditures 
are not so correlated with reentry intervals or changes in pesticide tolerances. After 
accounting for dietary risk and pesticide expenditures, Monsanto and Dow were most 
likely to have uses reregistered. Though there was some concern that small crops with 
low pesticide expenditures would suffer extra cancellations, small crop uses wer  no 
more likely to be cancelled than large crop uses. Mentions of individual pesticide in 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
How the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)1 decides which food-use pesticides 
are valuable and safe enough to remain on the market affects the potentially 
conflicting interests of growers, agricultural workers, consumers, and pesticid  
manufacturers.  The goal of this research is to assess the regulatory process for 
pesticides, and how it weighs the interests of these stakeholders: to what extent do th  
reregistration outcomes reflect the dietary and occupational risks of pesticid ?  Are 
regulatory outcomes protective of infants and children (as mandated by Congress) by 
restricting use on foods commonly consumed by children?  Is the likelihood of 
reregistration different for crops planted on a relatively small number of acres?  Do 
some pesticide manufacturers appear to be better able to influence pesticide 
regulations?  Does the existence of substitute pesticides on the market (or in the 
development pipeline) affect reregistration?   
The use of modern pesticides2 has made great contributions to agricultural 
productivity, but these benefits have been accompanied by significant risks to humans 
and wildlife.  Regulating the availability and use of pesticides on the market in the
United States has been the responsibility of the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) since the 1970s.  The stakes are high: overly protective regulation may 
result in significant productivity losses; a lack of regulation may result in the 
unnecessary endangerment of human and animal life.  Given the ramifications of 
                                                
1 EPA refers to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 
2 The term pesticide encompasses many agents, such a antimicrobials, wood preservatives, 
rodenticides, and chemicals for crop protection.  Pesticides discussed in this paper are restricted to jus  




pesticide regulation, as well as the public's concern about pesticide safety, an 
evaluation of the regulatory process is appropriate. 
Pesticide use increases crop yields, increases shelf life, and minimizes 
blemishes on fruits and vegetables.  Precise measurement of the benefits of pesticide 
use is complicated, however.  Most studies measure the effect of bans of select 
pesticides on select crops and date from over a decade ago.  A more recent study by 
CropLife International, an industry group, suggests that the elimination of herbicid s 
would cause a 20 percent reduction in production (Gianessi and Reigner, 2007).  
More regulation, even if not an outright ban, may have other adverse consequences: 
Ollinger and Fernandez-Cornejo (1998) find that greater regulatory costs reduce the 
number of pesticides introduced to the market. 
Concerns about the hazards of pesticides to humans and wildlife are 
numerous.  Human health concerns include the propensity of pesticides to cause 
cancer, endocrine disruption, and neurological damage (Pimentel and Greiner, 1997). 
Pimentel (2005) estimated $10 billion in environmental, societal, and crop losses 
from pesticide use, but such an estimate necessarily depends on sparse data and many 
assumptions. The safety of pesticides is a significant component of how growers 
value pesticides, but they place far more value on efficacy (Beach and Carlson, 1993).   
Effects on wildlife populations, particularly birds, have driven pesticide bans and 
restrictions, most famously the banning of DDT and related products in 1972.  Many 
of the possible dangers of individual pesticides are known, but there is always some 




Occupational exposure to pesticides tends to be much higher than that to 
consumers; however, dietary exposure to pesticides continues to be a subject of 
interest to the public.  Media coverage and public concern about Alar in 1989 were 
catalysts for its withdrawal (Marshall, 1991).  A survey conducted by Horowitz 
(1994) found consumers to be more concerned about pesticide risks than auto exhaust 
risks.   Another survey by Williams and Hammitt (2001) found that the perceived risk 
of conventional pesticides was similar to the mortality risk from motor vehicle 
accidents.  Growth in sales of organic products averaged 20 percent per year betw en 
1997 and 2003 (Oberholzer, Dimitri, and Greene, 2005). These findings suggest a 
lack of trust in the safety of conventional pesticides used in the United States, and 
indicate that more examination of the regulatory process may be in order. 
Earlier research has assessed the regulatory outcomes of EPA decisions, in 
particular Cropper et al. (1992) and Courbois (2000).  Since both of these were 
completed, the EPA has executed a major reregistration program of older pesticides, 
guided by a new set of directives under the Food Quality and Protection Act of 1996.   
Under the act, the EPA made new decisions about hundreds of active ingredients and 
their use on dozens of crops.  This implementation offers the opportunity to evaluate 
the influence of registrants on the EPA, how closely the EPA followed the directives 
of the Act, and whether the Act disproportionately affected some crops over others. 
 





o In the wake of reports in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
questioning the safety of pesticides, Congress passed the Food 
Quality and Protection Act of 1996 (FQPA).  Rather than continue 
the previous practice of balancing risks and benefits, Congress 
made dietary risks subject to a more rigid “reasonable certainty of 
no harm” standard.  This should have resulted in regulations that 
were more protective of consumers than previous regulations. 
• Are active ingredient and crop combinations with greater risks to children 
more likely to be cancelled?   
o A report by the National Academy of Sciences in 1993 pointed out 
how infants and children were especially vulnerable to pesticide 
exposure.  Infants and children metabolize toxins differently than 
adults, so pesticide standards developed with adults in mind may 
not be fully protective for children.  Of additional concern is the 
fact that children’s exposure may be significantly different than 
adults due to the fact that children weigh less and their diets consist 
of a relatively small range of crops, some of which are pesticide 
intensive. 
• Do occupational hazards appear to be significant factors in reregistration 
outcomes? 
o The most intensive exposure to pesticides is experienced by 
agricultural workers, including mixers, loaders, applicators, and all 




to the population as a whole is mostly dietary, workers may be 
exposed through multiple pathways, including dermal absorption 
and inhalation. In spite of the fact that pesticide poisonings are 
likely underreported, hundreds of incidents involving pesticide 
applicators and mixer/loaders were documented in California in 
2007 (California EPA, 2007).   
• Are active ingredients more likely to be cancelled on small crops 
(measured in terms of acreage)?   
o Registrants of pesticides obtain less revenue from crops planted on 
fewer acres, which includes many fruits and vegetables. At the 
same time, pesticides may be used intensively on many fruits and 
vegetables.  Canceling a pesticide on a low-acreage crop may 
therefore make a significant reduction in exposure and production.  
Smaller crops may have fewer substitute pesticides, making 
growers more vulnerable to losses in the event of a cancellation. 
The EPA is supposed to take the available substitutes into account 
during the decision process, but the “reasonable certainty of no 
harm” standard may limit this.  
• Are some registrants more successful at reregistering pesticides than 
others? 
o Industry consolidation over the past two decades has reduced the 
number of major registrants.  Major companies have ongoing 




significant influence on decisions.  In addition, they have several 
chemicals subject to reregistration, and may have more scope for 
negotiation across pesticides and uses. 
• Is there evidence that products were cancelled when registrants were 
about to bring substitutes onto the market?  
o Having a substitute pesticide in the pipeline may have reduced the 
incentive for registrants to complete reregistration of old 
pesticides.  The registrant may not care to complete the 
reregistration process to keep a pesticide that will compete with its 
own future products.  The EPA may anticipate that future products 
will be safer, and therefore may not rush a decision. 
• Did media coverage of pesticides appear to affect reregistration 
decisions? 
o Media coverage may drive greater public awareness of pesticide 
toxicity, and in turn, create additional public pressure for 
regulation.   
 
To address these questions, I have assembled a dataset encompassing over 100 
active ingredients and over 200 food-use crops subject to the reregistration process. 
After providing background on pesticide regulation and a broad overview of 
the dataset in Chapters 2 and 3, I address the research questions in three additional 








Chapter 4: Dietary Risk and Reregistration Decisions 
 
To examine whether the EPA was protective of dietary exposure to pesticides, 
and especially protective of infants and children, I use two approaches with two 
different outcome variables. The first approach consists of a probit model of the 
decision for each active ingredient/crop pair, where the outcome is either a 
reregistration or a cancellation. The second approach exploits the FQPA mandate that 
the EPA reevaluate all tolerances (or amount of residue legally allowed n 
commodities) for each active ingredient/crop pair.  In an ordered probit, I examine 
whether dietary risk has an effect on whether the EPA chooses to decrease, not 
change, or increase the tolerance level conditional on reregistration. In each model, 
the explanatory variables consist of measures of dietary risk derived from food 
consumption estimates used by the EPA and EPA measures of pesticide toxicity.   
To address whether the EPA was especially protective of infants and children, 
I use the same models with EPA’s measures of children’s consumption of 
commodities.  I find little effect of chronic dietary risk on pesticide rer gistration 
decisions for the population as a whole and for infant and child population subgroups. 
There is evidence that the EPA mitigated chronic dietary risk in other ways: higher 
chronic dietary risk pesticide uses were significantly more likely to have reduced 
tolerances. Congress mandated that the EPA not trade off dietary risk with benefits of 




of success in the reregistration process. Pesticide expenditures do not predict 
tolerance changes, however.  
Using two separate measures of cancer risk, I find no significant relationship 
between cancer risk and reregistration decisions, or cancer risk and tolerance ch nges. 
The data for dietary cancer risk is more limited than for chronic dietary risk, however.  
 
Chapter 5: Occupational Risk and Reregistration Decisions  
 
Several types of agricultural workers are exposed to pesticides through their 
occupations. Some of the ways the EPA may mitigate exposure include cancelling a 
use, reducing the maximum amount of active ingredient that may be applied per acre; 
increasing the required protective clothing or equipment; or increasing the reentry 
interval, or amount of time workers must wait before reentering a field after 
application. To test whether occupational hazards were significant factors in pe ticide 
regulations, I construct measures of occupational risk based on the EPA’s 
assumptions about exposure and toxicity levels.  
Occupational risk does not have significant effect on reregistrations when 
entered in the models linearly. It is possible that the EPA treated pesticid  uses with 
higher levels of risk differently, as there is evidence that riskier uses wer  more likely 
to be cancelled. Similar patterns emerge for risks specific to mixer/loaders. 
Though the effect of handler MOE on reregistration decisions appears to be 
minimal, there is evidence that the EPA mitigated risk through increased reentry 
intervals (REI) on reregistered pesticide uses. All measures of occupational risk 





One more substitute pesticide for a particular use resulted in REIs about six 
hours longer, though there was no significant effect for the relative prices of these 
substitutes. Pesticide expenditures were significant in models of reregistration 
decisions, but had no significant effect on REI. Occupational cancer risks have little 
to no discernable effect on decisions or REI, though this may be due to measurement 
error. 
 
Chapter 6: Additional Factors Influencing Pesticide Regulatory Decisions 
 
Several other factors may influence pesticide regulatory decisions beyond 
dietary and occupational risk. In this chapter, I examine more specifically the impact 
of individual pesticide manufacturers, the press coverage of pesticides, the size of the 
crop the pesticide is applied to, and the availability of possible alternatives. It appears 
that of the major pesticide registrants, Dow and Monsanto were most successful at 
reregistering pesticides, after controlling for dietary risks and pesticide expenditures. 
The size of the crop (measured in acres planted) the pesticide is used on also has no 
bearing on reregistration decision. Finally, media coverage of specific pest id s does 






Chapter 2: History of Pesticide Regulation in the United States 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
Early legislation regulating pesticides was intended primarily to protect farmers from 
ineffectual products or products that caused crop damage.  Under the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) of 1947, the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) registered pesticides before they could be sold 
between states. Not until FIFRA was amended in 1970 and control of pesticide 
registrations was transferred to the Environmental Protection Agency did the safety of 
pesticides become an important factor in registration decisions.3 
In the 1970s, Congress also directed the EPA to review past pesticide 
registrations.  This reregistration process was intended to put more emphasis on the 
safety of pesticide active ingredients.  In addition, increased knowledge of pesticide 
products and more sophisticated techniques for evaluating toxicity meant pesticides 
could be examined more thoroughly than in the past.  Although the EPA had the 
authority to reregister or deny reregistration to pesticides, the process proceeded 
slowly.  During the 1980s, the EPA prepared ‘reregistration standards’ which 
                                                
3 The EPA summarizes key elements of FIFRA on its websit : 
http://epa.gov/oecaerth//civil/fifra/fifraenfstatreq.html 
Timeline of Key Legislation Affecting Pesticide Regulation 
1947  Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) directs USDA to 
register pesticides and monitor their effectiveness 
1970  Responsibility for pesticide regulation transferred to newly created EPA 
1988 Amendment to FIFRA mandates a comprehensive reregistration process for all 
active ingredients first registered before 1984, and empowers the EPA to collect
reregistration fees 
1996 Food Quality and Protection Act requires that the reregistration process pay special
attention to dietary risks, risks to infants and children, and cumulative risks 




characterized pesticides and identified data gaps, but were not reregistration 
decisions.4  By the time FIFRA was amended again in 1988, the EPA had published 
reregistration standards for less than a third of active ingredients on the market.  
Under the Special Review process in the 1970s, the EPA also assessed some 
pesticides as specific risks came to light, on an ad hoc basis separate from 
reregistration. 
The 1988 amendments empowered the EPA to assess fees on pesticide 
registrants, which helped to fund the reregistration process and caused registrants to 
withdraw registrations of chemicals that they no longer sold (Caulkins 2008).  The 
EPA organized the 1,150 active ingredients subject to reregistration into 613 groups, 
or ‘cases’ which would be decided together.  These 613 cases were categorized into 
List A, List B, List C, and List D.  List A consisted of pesticides that had the highest 
priority for reregistration.  The 194 cases on List A included the pesticides of greatest 
concern to human health and most food use pesticides. Lists B through D categorized 
the remaining pesticide cases in order of priority.  
Of the 613 reregistration cases to be decided, 229 were cancelled in the early 
years of reregistration.5  Most often these cancellations were due to the registrant’s 
unwillingness to pay the fees or provide the required data to support the 
reregistration.6 The EPA used data provided by the registrants to compare the hazards 
                                                
4 This is an important distinction. Preparation of reregistration standards meant that much of the 
assessment of the pesticide was done, but the eligibility decisions were not made until later. Outcome 
variables for this research draw only from the REDs. 
5 A discussion of the pesticide reregistration process is also available at the EPA’s website: 
http://www.epa.gov/opp00001/reregistration/reregistration_facts.htm 
6 In cases where the registrant withdrew the use very ea ly in the reregistration process, the EPA 
generally did not produce a Reregistration Eligibility Decision.  As a result, these uses have very 




of each pesticide with its benefits. A profile of the pesticide along with any risk 
mitigations (such as limitations on applications or changes in required protective 
clothing for applicators) and cancellations were published in Reregistration Eligibility 
Decisions (REDs).  By 1998, the EPA had published REDs for 172 of the remaining 
384 cases (Status of pesticides in Registration, Reregistration, and Special Review 
(aka Rainbow Report) 1998). 
Food Quality and Protection Act of 1996 
FIFRA was amended again in 1996 by the Food Quality and Protection Act.  
The Delaney Clause, introduced in 1958 as part of an amendment to the Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act, prohibited any use of any food additive believed to be 
carcinogenic.  Since some pesticides concentrate during processing, they can be 
defined as food additives and are thus subject to the Delaney standard. In the early 
1990s, applying the Delaney standard as part of the reregistration process causd 
regulatory difficulties, as it would require cancellation of substances with any 
detectable level of carcinogenicity. There was a possibility that the clause would also 
block newer, safer pesticides from the market (Osteen 1994).  Since pesticides may 
concentrate during processing, they can be defined as food additives.  Improvements 
in detection technology meant that formerly undetectable residues would have to be 
prohibited.  FQPA was designed to bridge some of these obstacles, and in doing so, 
made significant changes to the procedures by which the EPA was to regulate 
pesticides. 
                                                                                                                                          
and models only to those uses where the registrant paid the fees and continued participation in the 




By the early 1990s, the EPA had collected fees from registrants wishing that 
their active ingredients be considered for reregistration, requested data, and issued 
REDs for a few pesticides. Before 1996, FIFRA dictated that the EPA balance 
pesticide benefits and risks in making pesticide reregistration decisions. The 1996 
Food Protection and Quality Act (FQPA), changed the both the criteria for 
registration and the ways in which nonoccupational health risks were measured. 
The standards of reregistration differ by type of hazard.  The pre-1996 FIFRA 
standard of weighing risks and benefits still applies to occupational and 
environmental effects.  For dietary or household exposure, FQPA restricted the 
consideration of benefits in the regulatory process, and instead adopted a ``reasonable 
certainty of no harm" standard.  Pesticides with food residues, persisting in the water 
supply, or encountered in the household are subject to this standard.  In addition, EPA 
was to set new maximum levels of pesticide residues, or tolerances, paying special
attention to the effects on sensitive subpopulations.  Even pesticides registered after 
1984, and not subject to reregistration, had to have their tolerances reevaluated.  
Besides changing the standard for dietary and household exposure, FQPA 
mandated changes in the ways health risks were measured and considered.  The EPA
was supposed to place more emphasis on the effects of chemicals on infants, children, 
and pregnant women (1996 Food Quality Protection Act Implementation Plan 1997). 
Another directive of FQPA was to consider the aggregate lifetime exposure f 
pesticides. To do this, the EPA was to calculate a ``risk cup," a maximum daily 




aggregated over all pesticides sharing a ``common mode of toxicity."  If the risk cup 
overflows, the EPA was to reduce tolerances for individual chemicals.  
FQPA also has special provisions for "minor use" pesticides (Report on Minor 
Uses of Pesticides n.d.).  Marketing pesticides for crops with relatively low acreage 
generally provides less revenue to pesticide manufacturers, and less incentive for 
them to complete the reregistration process for those uses. Because of concerns that 
registrants would choose not to support minor uses, FQPA is more lenient for minor 
uses, allowing data delivery extensions and waivers, data grants, and expedited 
review. 
User fees were set by FQPA and later in the Pesticide Registration 
Improvement Act (PRIA 1) in 2003 and PRIA 2 (2007).  Fees vary between a few 
thousand and hundreds of thousands of dollars, depending on the uses of the pesticide 
and its relationship to existing pesticides.  In addition, registrants pay for studies 
requested by the EPA to support their applications.  Rather than having registrants 
repeat the data collection for similarly formulated pesticides, the EPA allows 
registrants to use other companies' data.  Registrants are supposed to compensate 
other registrants for the use of their data, although the legislation does not specify the 
terms of these transactions. 
Enforcement of Pesticide Regulations 
Pesticide labels, which specify the maximum amount to apply, the methods of 
application, the allowable crops, and appropriate safety precautions, are law.  The 
EPA imposes fines when they discover the distribution of unregistered or unlabeled 




authority over whether pesticides are registered, and can set specific parameters for 
their use. 
 Though the EPA sets tolerances, enforcement of tolerance levels falls under 
the jurisdiction of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  The FDA and the 
USDA monitor pesticide residues on food, not the EPA. The setting of tolerances by 
the EPA does not guarantee their enforcement by the FDA. 
How successful the EPA is at enforcing label restrictions is outside the scop
of this research. The questions focus on EPA’s regulatory choices, not on their 
methods of enforcement. 
Literature on Pesticide Value and Health Effects 
The academic literature on pesticide use, benefits, health effects, and regulation spans 
many disciplines. I summarize the literature pertaining directly to the regulatory 
process: research that investigates issues of concern to the EPA in making pesticide 
decisions, and literature directly investigating the regulatory process.  
Pesticide Value 
For much of the reregistration period, expenditures on agricultural pesticides applied 
to crops totaled more than $8 billion (nominal) dollars annually (Fernandez-Cornejo, 
Nehring, et al. 2009). This figure gives some sense of the value of pesticides to 
pesticide registrants, but calculating the value to farmers is more involved. Pimentel 
et al. (1992) estimated that farmers receive a return of four dollars to every one dollar 
invested in pesticides. Though his research was published nearly two decades ago, it 




survey of the literature on returns to pesticide use, Fernandez-Cornejo, Jans, and 
Smith (1998) find positive returns to pesticide use, but point out that these benefits 
seem to be diminishing over time.    
As the EPA generally considers pesticide benefits on a case by case basis, and 
is instructed to take these benefits into account for some parts of their regulatory 
decisions.  Lichtenberg, Parker, and Zilberman (1988) developed methodology for 
measuring pesticide benefits, and applied it to individual uses of pesticides. Some 
EPA decisions make use of data on the benefits of pesticide uses, generally data from 
the EPA’s own impact assessments, the benefits of most individual uses remain 
unquantified.  Even if data on benefits was available for most uses, the benefits of 
pesticides are not static.  Pest pressure can change over time.  Availability of 
alternative pesticides can change. Repeated application of the same pesticide may 
results in pest resistance. 
Environmental costs and benefits of pesticide use are also considered by the 
EPA, but can be even trickier to identify. Adoption of glyphosate-resistant crops 
(which are tolerant to the widely-used herbicide) results in reduced tillage of soil 
(Givens 2009), and therefore reduces erosion.  Reduced tillage may also result in a 
reduction of greenhouse gases through carbon sequestration (Uri 2001). 
 
Studies of Health Effects of Pesticides  
The EPA relies on a large body of research studying the effects of pesticides 
on laboratory animals. This data on toxicity for animals was extrapolated to humans 
and matched to exposure information in EPA assessments of human health effects. To 




data; to calculate occupational exposure, the EPA used data on the quantity of 
pesticide handled, the percent absorbed, and information on formulation and 
application method. Though animal studies serve as the foundation for all the EPA’s 
analyses of pesticide toxicity and health effects, they are far too numero s to discuss 
here. The EPA did not typically rely on studies of the direct human health effects of 
pesticides; below I summarize some of the difficulties in the literature in identifying 
human health effects. 
Research attempting to link human health outcomes and pesticide use faces 
some serious obstacles.  For acute poisoning, many pesticide incidents likely go 
unreported: an affected person may not realize the source of their illness, may not 
seek treatment, or the illness may go unreported by health professionals.  Tracking 
chronic health effects due to chronic exposure is even harder, as they require 
information on pesticide exposure and health outcomes over time for a population, as 
well as outcomes for a (presumably) unexposed control group.  In a survey of the 
literature by Alavanja, Hoppin, and Kamel (2004), the relationship between health 
and pesticide use was inconclusive.  World Health Organization (1990) suggests there 
may be additional research that went unpublished because the results were 
inconclusive. 
Given limited data on long-term health outcomes, I instead rely on what the 





Literature on Regulatory Processes in the U.S. 
Economists and political scientists have analyzed regulatory processes and their 
outcomes for several agencies, including the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(Kosnik 2010), the National Forest Service (Sabatier, Loomis and McCarthy 1995), 
the Food and Drug Administration (Olson (1995), (1997), (2000)) the Fish and 
Wildlife Service (Ando 1999), as well as the EPA. There is evidence that a variety of 
factors that may influence regulators’ decisions: regulators’ concern for public 
welfare, interest group lobbying, firm characteristics, congressional pressure, and the 
regulatory status quo.     
Kosnik (2010) finds that direct congressional action has more influence on the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission than does interest group lobbying. In her 
analysis, FERC decisions also exhibit some path dependence: though decisions on 
dams would presumably be independent from one another, decisions are correlated to 
FERC’s past actions. My research investigates somewhat similar facto s: whether the 
EPA followed Congress’ specific direction in reregistering pesticides, and whether 
individual registrants received different treatment in the process. Olson (1997) found 
that the FDA had shorter review times for pharmaceutical companies that were 
relatively less diversified and more R&D intensive, suggesting that the characteristics 
of individual firms influenced regulator behavior. 
Cropper et al. (1992) found that the comments made by grower groups and 
academics were significant in the EPA's Special Review decisions on pesticides. 
Yates and Stroup (2000) extend this analysis to include media coverage, finding that 




evidence that interested parties could delay the process of classifying a species to an 
endangered list.  The Fish and Wildlife Service's action could be slowed by petitions 
and hearing requests, an outcome beneficial to groups who would incur costs when 
the species was listed. 
Pesticide Regulation 
Only a few papers concentrate directly on the EPA's process of pesticide 
regulation.  Cropper et al. (1992) examined outcomes of the EPA’s Special Reviews, 
ad hoc investigations of individual pesticides that occur when significant risks come 
to the attention of the EPA.  In a special review, the EPA assesses the risks and 
benefits of the pesticide and determines whether it may stay on the market.  Cropper 
et al. modeled the EPA's decision using risks and benefits, along with the pressure 
exerted by interested parties in their comments, and showed that the implicit value for 
avoiding a cancer case was $35 million. They found that while the EPA appeared to 
balance benefits and risks, they also seemed to be subject to the commentary of 
interested parties.  In addition, Cropper et al. rejected the ``bright line" hypothesis 
that pesticides exceeding a certain risk limit would be canceled, and calculated the 
implicit value the EPA was placing on a statistical life. 
In his unpublished dissertation, Courbois (2000) took a different approach to 
explaining pesticide regulatory outcomes.  Instead of examining the select group of 
pesticides that underwent special review, Courbois (2000) looked at a much larger 
universe of food use active ingredients, and examined the changes in registrations 




Courbois (2000) also made a different choice in modeling the decision 
process.  Rather than attributing the decision to the EPA, he assumed that each 
pesticide registrant could choose to register an active ingredient for any c op, 
provided it was willing to allocate enough resources to the reregistration process.  The 
analysis did not focus on a set of EPA decisions, but rather tracked the stock of 
registered active ingredient/crop pairs over time. Courbois' data allowed him to 
consider the effects of many different measures of toxicity on pesticide registrations. 
He included variables to reflect a number of other possible factors, including per-acre 







Chapter 3:  Overview of Data 
Scope of the Data 
 All pesticides complete an initial registration process before they may be 
introduced to the U.S. market.  Older pesticides, defined as those first registered 
before November 1, 1984, were subject to the EPA’s reregistration process. In 1988, 
the EPA announced 613 “cases,” consisting of single pesticides or groupings of 
similar pesticides, which were a comprehensive listing of active ingredients subject to 
reregistration.  Although all of the active ingredients included in my data were part of 
these 613 cases, there are several other criteria that had to be met for inclusion in my 
dataset. Reregistration Eligibility Decisions used in this dataset wer  published 
between 1990 and 2008. Over 80% of the decisions were published after FQPA was 
passed in 1996.  Those what were published before the legislation were revisited by 
the EPA to comply with the new requirements. 
Further Participation in the Reregistration Process 
 In order to continue in the reregistration process in 1988, registrants had to 
pay a registration fee for each product on the market.  For pesticides with sign ficant 
sales, this fee was nominal; however, there were many pesticide products on the 
EPA’s list that were little used or no longer produced.  In 1989 and 1990, products for 
which fees were not paid lost their registrations.  Since no further registration action 
was taken (and little documentation is available) for these pesticides, they are not 




Herbicides, Insecticides, and Fungicides 
 The same active ingredient can control more than one type of target pest. 
Ziram, for example, is used as a fungicide but is also used as a bird and rodent 
repellent.7   To be included in my data, the active ingredient had to have some 
herbicidal, insecticidal, or fungicidal uses, which encompass the overwhelming 
majority of field crop applications.  This excludes pesticides designed exclusively for 
vertebrates, such as rodenticides and bird repellents.  It also excludes antimicrobials, 
which are often used in food preparation settings, but not so often in the field, and 
fumigants.  Though fumigants can be used in the field on food use crops, their 
method of application and inherent risks are quite different than other agricultural 
pesticides.  In addition, most fumigant uses in my data would have been of Methyl 
Bromide, the use of which is restricted for reasons separate from the reregistration 
process.   
 Insecticides comprise the largest share of observations in my data, with 1204.  
There are 909 herbicides and 609 fungicides. These numbers, however, reflect the 
total uses for all active ingredients.  Of the 120 active ingredients represented in the 
dataset, only 39 are insecticides while 60 are herbicides, and 21 are fungicides.  
Herbicides are the most heavily used group by pounds and by acres.  The U.S. 
Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service reports 360 million pounds of 
herbicides applied to crops in 1997, which is more than six times the pounds used of 
either insecticides or fungicides (Osteen and Livingston, Pest Management Practices 
2006).  This disparity is due in part to the types of crops generally treated with each 
                                                
7 EXTOXNET, a database of pesticide profiles hosted by Cornell University, provides useful 





type of pesticide.  Herbicides are heavily used on major field crops such as corn and 
soybeans, which represent a large share of agricultural production.  Insecticides and 
fungicides are most heavily used on specialty crops, such as fruits and vegetables, 
which represent far less acreage. 
  
Agricultural, Food-use Pesticides with Field Application Only 
 Since this research focuses on dietary exposure and occupational exposure in 
agriculture, all other uses of pesticides were excluded.  In order to be included, a 
pesticide had to be applied directly to a food crop while it was still in the field.  On 
the dietary risk side, I wanted only pesticide uses where population would eat the 
same commodity that had been treated with pesticide. On the occupational side, I 
wanted applications to occur in the field, so that there would be more opportunity to 
compare application rates and other common restrictions. In practice, this meant the 
following types of active ingredients and their uses were excluded: 
 
• Pesticides uses in  non-agricultural settings, such as against termites, for 
mosquito control, or as a weed killer on a golf course; 
• Pesticides use on livestock; 
• Pesticides use on feed crops, such as corn for silage and alfalfa; 
• Non-food crops, such as ornamentals and tobacco.  Cotton is included, 
however, because of the use of cottonseed for oil; 
• Pesticides uses that were exclusively post-harvest (applied in food storage 




• Homeowner uses.  
 
Other Exclusions 
 Some other pesticides, though they met all the above criteria, were also 
excluded.  In a few of the EPA’s “cases”, such as copper compounds, too many 
pesticides were combined to make matches with usage and toxicity data accurate.  
Some compounds, such as sulfur, boric acid, and petroleum distillate, are naturally 
occurring and were applied in such large quantities that their comparison to other 
pesticides seemed inappropriate. 
 Pesticides consisting of or derived from bacteria, viruses, or antibiotics were 
also excluded.  Bacillus thuringiensis was excluded, for example, since the properties 
of Bt and the quantity applied differ considerably from the other pesticides in the
data. 
 
Data on the EPA’s Regulatory Choices 
During the reregistration process, the EPA had several instruments at its dispo al for 
reducing risk, including cancelling pesticide uses outright, reducing applic tion rates, 
adjusting pesticide tolerances, changing the level of required personal protective 
equipment, or restricting the area to which pesticides may be applied.  
Data on pesticide reregistration decisions 
The data on pesticide reregistration decisions spans 120 active ingredients. Duri g 
reregistration, the EPA had to declare each pesticide use to be either cancelled or 




the registrant participated in the reregistration process, but at some point withdre  
their pesticide use rather than meet the EPA’s requirements or face legal action. 
Whether or not a crop was “eligible” for reregistration was stated in the 
Reregistration Eligibility Decision (RED) for the active ingredient, accompanied by 
documentation of the usage and health risks.  In cases where an active ingredient was 
cancelled before a full RED was published, information on decisions comes from the 
Federal Register or other EPA publications.   
All crop uses that met the criteria given above were included in the dataset.  
Most often, the EPA specified individual crops in the Reregistration Eligibility 
Decisions. In some cases, however, they specified a crop group, such as Pome Fruit, 
instead of individual crops.8  In these cases, I expanded the data to cover significant 
crops in the category (if Pome Fruit was a listed use, I would create observations for 
apples and pears).  For a detailed listing of crops and their crop groups, see Appendix 
3.A.   
Table 1 summarizes the reregistration outcomes by crop group.  Several fruit 
and vegetable groups, such as Berry, Brassica, Herbs, Fruiting Vegetables, and Pome 
Fruit, have reregistration rates below the average of 81%.  Large field crop grou s, 
such as Grain and Oilseed, have reregistration rates above 81%.  Interestingly, crops 
for which no group is specified (which are generally small, orphan crops) also have 
above average reregistration rates. 
 
                                                
8 Crop groups are based on EPA definitions, from the Pesticide Use Index published by the EPA’s 
Office of Pesticide Programs, October 2006. Crop groups allow the EPA to use data from 
representative crops, with similar characteristics and cultural practices, rather than requiring data for 





Table 1: Reregistration decisions by crop group  
Crop Group Pct. Reregistered Total AI 
Berry 75% 221 
Brassica 77% 214 
Bulb 90% 67 
Citrus 88% 170 
Cucurbit 81% 153 
Fruiting Vegetables 73% 110 
Fungi 57% 7 
Grain 84% 252 
Herbs 76% 34 
Leafy 81% 124 
Legume 79% 213 
Nut 86% 160 
Oilseed 86% 114 
Pome 78% 101 
Stone 82% 229 
Tuber 81% 237 
Total 81% 2,722 
No Group Specified 83% 316 
   
Reregistration decisions by crop and crop group are available in the Appendix at the end of the chapter. 
Crop group definitions are based on EPA classificatons of crops. AI refers to active ingredients. 
 
Consumption patterns and cultural practices vary by crop group.  Children in 
the U.S eat relatively high amounts of commodities in the Stone Fruit and Pome Fruit 
categories.  Larger field crops generally have a high level of mechanizatio , meaning 
that per acre, fewer workers come into close contact with the crop.  Pest pressure and 
the application rate necessary for pest control vary considerably between crops.  The 
equipment required for application may be quite different for fruit trees, vegetables, 
and field crops, with different risks to workers.  
 Pesticide registrations (and crop practices) vary widely by crop group.  Large
field crops in the Grain and Legume groups have many herbicide registrations, 
whereas vegetables in the Brassica, Leafy, or Fruiting Vegetables groups have more 




agriculture in the U.S. are herbicides (Fernandez-Cornejo, Nehring, et al. 2009) there 
are fewer registrations than for insecticides.  This is driven in part by the heavy use of 
a few herbicides on field crops, such as atrazine and glyphosate. 
 
Table 2: Frequencies by crop group and pesticide 
type 
Crop Group Fungicide Herbicide Insecticide Total 
Berry 55 75 91 221 
Brassica 60 32 122 214 
Bulb 25 18 24 67 
Citrus 18 63 89 170 
Cucurbit 39 35 79 153 
Fruiting Vegetables 24 26 60 110 
Fungi 1 0 6 7 
Grain 64 106 82 252 
Herbs 16 6 12 34 
Leafy 34 28 62 124 
Legume 43 84 86 213 
Nut 16 69 75 160 
Oilseed 22 42 50 114 
Pome 19 31 51 101 
Stone 59 82 88 229 
Tuber 56 69 112 237 
No Group Specified 58 143 115 316 
Total 609 909 1,204 2,722 
Crop groups based on EPA definitions. In the data, each pesticide may only have one type.  
Frequencies are counts of unique active ingredients. 
 
To give context for crops, I also list the total acres planted according to the 
1992 Agricultural Census (see Appendix 3.A).  Rhubarb and chicory had just a few 
hundred acres planted each, while corn, the largest crop, had tens of millions of acres 
planted.  Crops with a large number of acres often have dozens of pesticide 





Table 3: Pesticide reregistration by type of pesticide 
Type N Pct. Reregistered 
Fungicides 609 77% 
Herbicides 909 97% 
Insecticides 1204 71% 
In the data, each pesticide may only have one type. Fr quencies are counts of unique uses. 
 
 Insecticides make up 1204 out of 2722 observations in the data, but have the 
lowest reregistration rate of 71%.  Herbicides represent about a third of the data, and 
had nearly all uses reregistered.  The number of crop uses for an active ingredie t 
varies substantially: molinate, for example, is used on just one crop in the data, while 
glyphosate, a widely used herbicide, is registered on 140 crops.  In many cases, all 
uses of a particular active ingredient were reregistered.  All uses were rer gistered on 
a majority of active ingredients.  Just 11 had all of their uses cancelled, and 31 ha a 
mixture of reregistrations and cancellations. A detailed list of active ingredients by 





















1,2-Dihydro-3,6-Pyridazinedione  1994 100% 2 
2,4-D 2005 100% 30 
2,4-Db 2005 100% 3 
Acetochlor 2006 100% 1 
Acifluorfen 2004 100% 3 
Alachlor 1998 100% 8 
Asulam (Ansi) 1995 100% 1 
Atrazine 2003 100% 4 
Bentazone 1995 100% 10 
Bromacil 1996 100% 3 
Bromoxynil 1998 100% 13 
Butylate 1993 100% 2 
Chloridazon 2005 100% 2 
Chlorimuron-Ethyl 2004 100% 2 
Chlorpropham 1996 100% 2 
Chlorsulfuron 2005 100% 3 
Dcpa 1998 85% 34 
Dicamba 2006 100% 8 
Dichlobenil 1998 47% 19 
Diclofop-Methyl 2000 100% 2 
Difenzoquat Methyl Sulfate 1994 100% 2 
Diquat Dibromide 1995 100% 11 
Diuron 2003 97% 40 
Endothall 2005 100% 3 
Eptc 1999 100% 25 
Ethalfluralin 1995 100% 11 
Fluazifop-Butyl 2005 100% 20 
Fluometuron 2005 100% 1 
Fomesafen 2008 0% 4 
Glyphosate 1993 100% 140 
Hexazinone 1994 100% 3 
Imazapyr 2006 100% 1 
Lactofen 2003 100% 4 
Linuron 1995 91% 11 
MCPA 2004 88% 8 
Mepiquat Chloride 1997 100% 1 











Metribuzin 1998 100% 12 
Molinate 2004 0% 1 
Nicosulfuron 2004 100% 1 
Norflurazon 2002 100% 29 
Oryzalin 1994 100% 16 
Oxyfluorfen 2002 100% 54 
Paraquat 1997 100% 88 
Pendimethalin 1997 100% 39 
Phenmedipham 2005 100% 3 
Picloram 1995 100% 3 
Primisulfuron-Methyl 2002 100% 1 
Prometryn 1996 100% 4 
Pronamide 2002 100% 19 
Propachlor 1998 100% 2 
Propanil 2003 25% 4 
Sethoxydim 2005 100% 56 
Simazine 2006 100% 28 
Terbacil 1998 100% 13 
Thidiazuron 2005 100% 1 
Tri-Allate 2001 100% 6 
Tribufos 2000 100% 1 
Triclopyr 1998 100% 1 
Trifluralin 1996 99% 68 








Acephate 2001 100% 12 
Aldicarb 2007 85% 13 
Amitraz 1995 100% 2 
Azinphos-Methyl 2001 23% 44 
Carbaryl 2007 99% 81 
Carbofuran 2006 0% 24 
Chlorpyrifos 2006 98% 54 
Cryolite 1996 80% 35 
Cypermethrin 2006 100% 13 
Diazinon 2004 81% 58 
Dicofol 1998 100% 43 
Dicrotophos 2006 100% 1 
Diflubenzuron 1997 100% 8 
Dimethoate 2007 79% 43 
Disulfoton 2002 62% 26 
Endosulfan 2002 91% 57 











Ethoprophos 2001 92% 12 
Fenamiphos 2002 0% 26 
Fenvalerate 2003 0% 49 
Fonofos 1999 0% 22 
Lindane 2006 0% 5 
Malathion 2006 90% 110 
Methamidophos 2002 25% 8 
Methidathion 2002 100% 24 
Methomyl 1998 100% 72 
Methoxychlor 2004 0% 53 
Methyl-Parathion 2003 35% 52 
Naled 2002 100% 36 
Oxamyl 2000 97% 31 
Oxydemeton-Methyl 2002 83% 41 
Parathion 2000 0% 7 
Permethrin 2007 98% 41 
Phorate 2001 92% 12 
Phosmet 2001 100% 25 
Profenofos 2000 100% 1 
Propargite 2001 77% 43 
Terbufos 2001 100% 4 
Thiodicarb 1998 100% 9 







Benomyl 2001 0% 72 
Captan 2004 100% 58 
Carboxin 2004 100% 16 
Chloroneb 2005 100% 4 
Chlorothalonil 1999 100% 38 
Dichloran 2006 100% 21 
Etridiazole 2000 100% 9 
Folpet 1999 100% 1 
Fosetyl-Al 1990 100% 19 
Iprodione 1998 100% 35 
Mancozeb 2005 100% 58 
Maneb 2005 89% 37 
Metalaxyl 1994 100% 65 
Metiram 2005 100% 2 
Propiconazole 2006 100% 31 
Quintozene 2006 50% 14 
Thiram 2004 96% 57 











Triphenyltin Hydroxide 1999 100% 3 
Vinclozolin 2000 6% 17 
Ziram 2003 26% 47 










Table 5: Reregistration decisions and acres planted 
by crop 
crop group crop percent reregistered acres planted N 
Berries blackberries 89% 6,994 19 
 blueberries 85% 43,184 27 
 boysenberries 79%  14 
 bushberries 100%  1 
 caneberries 83%  6 
 cranberries 73% 29,573 22 
 currants 63% 317 8 
 elderberries 50%  2 
 gooseberries 57%  7 
 Grapes 71% 867,151 41 
 huckleberries 67%  3 
 juneberry 100%  1 
 lingonberry 100%  1 
 loganberries 77%  13 
 Raisins 0%  1 
 raspberries 75% 15,899 24 
 Salal 100%  1 
 strawberries 70% 51,548 30 
 Total 75% 230,604 221 
Brassica bok choy 0%  1 
 broccoli 78% 122,429 32 
 broccoli raab 75%  4 
 brussels sprouts 77%  31 
 cabbage 76% 95,445 37 
 cauliflower 77% 62,465 35 
 chinese broccoli 100%  4 
 chinese cabbage 93% 8,824 14 
 Collards 75% 16,062 24 
 kale 75% 7,950 20 
 kohlrabi 67%  12 
 Total 77% 63,602 214 
Bulbs Garlic 89% 21,179 19 
 leek 100%  4 
 onions 85% 138,060 34 
 shallots 100%  6 
 green onions 100% 12,395 4 
 Total 90% 93,113 67 
Citrus calamondin 100%  1 




crop group crop percent reregistered acres planted N 
 grapefruit 85% 206,230 34 
 kumquat 100%  4 
 lemons 85% 67,329 34 
 limes 92% 7,697 24 
 oranges 86% 915,947 35 
 tangelos 91% 14,474 11 
 tangerines 92% 21,511 26 
 Total 88% 257,697 170 
Cucurbits cantaloupe 80% 106,938 30 
 chayote 100%  1 
 cucumbers 80% 138,639 30 
 muskmelon 80%  5 
 pumpkins 81% 63,260 26 
 squash 83% 69,029 29 
 watermelons 81% 220,244 31 
 winter melon 100%  1 
 Total 81% 122,202 153 
Fruiting vegetables eggplant 73% 8,097 22 
 groundcherry 75%  4 
 okra 75% 4,336 8 
 pepino 100%  1 
 peppers 70% 73,966 37 
 tomatoes 74% 397,368 38 
 Total 73% 171,900 110 
Fungi mushrooms 57%  7 
 Total 57%  7 
Grains barley 84% 6,818,065 31 
 buckwheat 100% 64,554 2 
 corn 80% 69,339,872 54 
 millet 100%  5 
 oats 78% 4,187,873 23 
 popcorn 87% 321,485 15 
 rice 85% 3,117,718 20 
 rye 88% 336,248 16 
 triticale 89% 22,188 9 
 wheat 81% 59,089,472 37 
 wild rice 100% 34,437 4 
 sweet corn 89% 762,132 36 
 Total 84% 25,663,176 252 
Herbs anise 0%  1 




crop group crop percent reregistered acres planted N 
 dill 67%  6 
 fennel 75%  4 
 mustard 80% 12,775 20 
 Total 76% 12,775 34 
Leafy vegetables arugula 100%  1 
 cardoon 0%  1 
 celery 80% 37,007 25 
 dandelions 67%  3 
 endive 93% 1,942 14 
 greens 100%  1 
 lettuce 78% 287,468 32 
 parsley 88% 5,439 8 
 radicchio 100%  1 
 rhubarb 100% 861 7 
 spinach 68% 40,583 22 
 swiss chard 100%  9 
 Total 81% 102,719 124 
Legumes cowpeas 75% 32329 4 
 dry beans 76% 1,548,766 38 
 dry peas 67% 32,329 6 
 garbanzos 100%  5 
 guar 100% 6,836 2 
 legume 100%  1 
 lentils 75%  12 
 Lima beans 90% 43,056 21 
 mung beans 100%  1 
 pea and bean 100%  1 
 peas 76% 328,287 33 
 pigeon peas 100%  1 
 Snap beans 74% 272,698 39 
 soybeans 80% 56,351,304 49 
 Total 79% 14,806,129 213 
Nuts almonds 86% 441,700 35 
 beechnuts 100%  3 
 brazil nuts 100%  3 
 butternut 100%  3 
 cashews 100%  3 
 chestnuts 100%  6 
 chinquapin 100%  1 
 hazelnuts 81% 32,674 21 




crop group crop percent reregistered acres planted N 
 macadamias 92% 23,155 12 
 pecans 77% 473,426 30 
 pistachios 85% 69,344 13 
 walnuts 85% 214,159 27 
 Total 86% 270,363 160 
Oilseeds canola 80% 89,777 10 
 cotton 84% 10,961,720 58 
 crambe 100%  1 
 flaxseed 100% 156,630 9 
 jojoba 100% 15,010 1 
 rapeseed 100% 89,777 2 
 safflower 92% 264,837 13 
 sesame 100%  1 
 sunflower 79% 1,905,088 19 
 Total 86% 6,271,248 114 
Pome fruits apples 74% 583,624 43 
 crabapples 100%  5 
 loquat 100%  4 
 pears 79% 83,183 38 
 quince 73%  11 
 Total 78% 348,849 101 
Stone fruits apricots 85% 26,984 33 
 cherries 86% 126,395 42 
 nectarines 80% 40,971 41 
 peaches 80% 226,029 46 
 plums 76% 60,116 37 
 prunes 83% 82,002 30 
 Total 82% 100,264 229 
Tubers beets 74% 10,523 19 
 carrots 83% 108,250 29 
 chicory 67% 847 6 
 chinese radish 0%  1 
 ginger 100% 325 1 
 ginseng 100% 1,505 4 
 horseradish 100%  6 
 parsnips 100%  6 
 potatoes 87% 1,351,084 47 
 radishes 79% 29,893 19 
 rutabagas 58%  12 
 salsify 100%  1 




crop group crop percent reregistered acres planted N 
 taro 100% 496 3 
 turnips 72% 9,256 25 
 yam 78%  9 
 sweet potatoes 90%  20 
 Total 81% 601,456 237 
Group not specified acerola 100%  2 
 artichokes 73% 9,193 11 
 asparagus 85% 85,929 26 
 atenoya 100%  1 
 avocados 86% 74,344 14 
 bananas 79%  14 
 breadfruit 100%  1 
 cacao 100%  1 
 carambola 100%  2 
 casaba 100%  1 
 castor beans 100%  2 
 cherinoya 100%  1 
 chinese mustard 100%  1 
 chinese okra 100%  1 
 cocoa 100%  2 
 coffee 86% 7,783 7 
 conifers 0%  1 
 crenshaw 100%  1 
 dates 100% 5,977 4 
 dewberries 63%  8 
 eggfruit 100%  1 
 feijoa 100%  1 
 figs 64% 20,131 11 
 gourds 100%  1 
 guava 100% 1,350 4 
 honeydew 89% 35,005 9 
 hops 83% 40,549 12 
 jackfruit 100%  1 
 kenaf 100%  1 
 kitembilla 100%  1 
 kiwi 75% 7,398 8 
 litchi 100%  1 
 longan 100%  2 
 mango 71%  7 
 manioc 100%  1 




crop group crop percent reregistered acres planted N 
 olives 100% 35,636 8 
 papaya 91% 3,733 11 
 passion fruit 100% 64 4 
 peanuts 76% 1,594,611 42 
 peppermint 100%  2 
 persimmon 100%  3 
 pimentos 0% 1,236 1 
 pineapples 82% 15,500 17 
 plantains 67%  6 
 pomegranates 100%  3 
 rape 100%  1 
 sapota 100%  1 
 soursop 100%  1 
 spearmint 100%  2 
 sugar apple 100%  2 
 sugarcane 75% 883,927 20 
 tamarind 100%  1 
 tea 100%  1 
 temples 50%  2 
 watercress 75% 505 4 
 yautia 100%  1 
 youngberries 33%  3 






Chapter 4: Pesticide Regulation and Dietary Risk Mitigation 
under the Food Quality and Protection Act 
Introduction 
In the U.S., the public knows that pesticides are used on crops.  Articles about 
pesticide use and exposure appear regularly in the popular press.9 What most of the 
population does not know is the level of risk to health that the use of pesticides on 
food-use crops presents.  It would be costly for consumers to investigate the 
properties, usage, and residues of even a few active ingredients.   
Many health, environmental, and economic concerns affect pesticide 
regulation, but dietary risk has been a primary motivator of government action.  In 
1996, the Food Quality and Protection Act directed the EPA to increase scrutiny of 
the dietary risks of pesticides in several ways.  First, the legislation directed that 
instead of balancing pesticide costs and benefits, the EPA should adopt a “reasonable 
certainty of no harm” standard.  Second, the EPA was to assess the cumulative risk of 
pesticides with similar mechanisms of toxicity—two particularly important classes of 
pesticides assessed were the organophosphates and n-methyl carbamates. Prior o 
FQPA, the EPA examined each active ingredient separately.  In addition, the EPA 
was to add an additional layer of safety for vulnerable populations, such as infants, 
children, and pregnant women. FQPA required that the EPA set a tolerance 
(allowable level of pesticide residue on commodities) for each reregistered p sticide 
use. 
                                                
9 Environmental Working Group’s annual “Shopper’s Guide to Pesticides in Produce” usually receives 
media attention.  A description of their findings and methodology is available online at 
http://www.ewg.org/foodnews/ (accessed August 17, 2011), but gives an incomplete ic ure of 




 In examining dietary risk, the EPA considers chronic, non-cancer health risk 
and cancer risk separately.   
I examine the effect of dietary risk measures on reregistration outcome and 
change in the tolerance.  I find that uses with higher chronic dietary health risk are 
more likely to be cancelled (significant at the 10% level).  Among pesticide uses that 
are reregistered, higher risk uses are significantly more likely to have t eir tolerances 
reduced. Pesticide uses with higher chronic health risks to infants and children were 
less likely to be reregistered, with coefficients and significant levels mirroring that of 
the population. 
 Uses with higher cancer risks are more likely to be cancelled, but these effects
are not significant across several measures of carcinogenicity.  Cancer risk also has an 
insignificant effect on tolerance changes. Cancer risk data is available for a limited 
and possibly unrepresentative subset of the decisions, however.  
 Pesticide expenditures significantly increased the probability of reregistration, 
though they were not a factor the EPA was directed to consider in dietary 
assessments.  Expenditures were not as important in determining tolerance ch g s.  
How the EPA Assesses Dietary Risk 
Chronic dietary risk includes two broad categories of health outcomes: cancer risk 
and non-cancer health risks. Cancer risk includes tumor growths; chronic dietary risk 
refers to the risk of noncancer adverse health outcomes due to prolonged exposure to 
pesticides.  Such outcomes include organ degeneration or reduction in reproductive 
capacity.   Both kinds of health outcomes result from prolonged exposure to 




assumes small increments of exposure result in additional risk.  For chronic, non-
cancer risks, the EPA uses thresholds, which assume exposure below an estimated 
level is safe.  
 
Assessment of Chronic, Non-Cancer Health Risks 
Assessment of chronic dietary non-cancer risk includes two main components: a 
measurement of the amount of the pesticide actually ingested, and an amount of 
pesticide considered safe to ingest.  Though the EPA may adjust these measures 
based on the scope and quality of data available, the comparison of actual levels of 
consumption and safe levels of consumption captures the essence of EPA’s analysi
of dietary risk.   
Measurement of chronic, non-cancer dietary pesticide consumption takes into 
account two routes of exposure: food and drinking water.  Food exposure by active 
ingredient is the sum of the product of total dietary intake (mg/kg-day) by commodity 
and pesticide residue (parts per million) by crop j and active ingredient i:
	









The EPA uses data from the United States Department of Agriculture 
Continuing Survey of Food Intake by Individuals (CSFII 1994-96, 98) to measure 
consumption of individual commodities.10  Dietary intake data is expressed in per day 
consumption, adjusted for 70 kilograms of body weight to yield mg/kg-day values.  
Chronic risks and acute risks may be calculated differently, with mean consumption 
                                                
10 U.S. EPA Exposure Factors Handbook (External Review Draft) 2009 Update. U.S. Environmental 




more often used for chronic exposure, and values on the higher end of the distribution 
used for acute exposure.11  
In many cases, the EPA assumed the residue was equal to the tolerance (the 
maximum allowed residue of an active ingredient on a crop).  When actual residue 
data was available12 and there were dietary risk concerns, the EPA used actual residue 
values to calculate exposure.   
Exposure estimates are then compared to reference doses (RfD), or the level 
of exposure that the EPA considers safe.  The RfD is based on the No Observed 
Adverse Effect Level (NOAEL), or highest dosage at which no ill effects are found in 
laboratory animals.  The NOAEL is then adjusted with two safety factors: an 
interspecies safety factor to account for the extrapolation of animal data to humans, 
and an intraspecies safety factor to account for variations within the human 
population (The Role of Use-related Information in Pesticide Risk Assessment and 
Risk Management 2000): 
 
	  	   (2) 
 
Usually each of these safety factors is equal to 10, though the EPA may relax the 
safety factors if the data support a change. The ratio of the RfD to the level of 
exposure, adjusted for additional safety factors chosen by the EPA, yields a 
Population Adjusted Dose (PAD): 
 
 
                                                
11 Conversation with David Hrdy, USEPA. 
12 The USDA’s Pesticide Data Program samples foods at the point of sale to measure the levels of 
active ingredient residues.  Data are collected for several crop and active ingredient pairs, with 
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The EPA considers PADs less than one not of concern.13  
Assessment of Dietary Cancer Risk 
Non-cancer risks are treated as threshold effects: below some safe level of xposure, 
the EPA expects no adverse effect.  Cancer effects, however, are more often handled 
linearly.  Small doses are generally assumed to increase cancer risk by some amount.  
The EPA uses dose-response models to estimate the 95th percentile of the dose 
response curve, or an upper estimate of how the probability of getting cancer changes 
with exposure to the chemical. The q* (cancer cases per million population per 
mg/kg-day of exposure) is multiplied by the exposure (in mg/kg-day) to yield cancer 
risk: 
 &  	
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 (4) 
 
The EPA considers the estimated probability of cancer, or q*, to be not of concern if 
it is below one in a million (1 X 10-6). 
Routes of Dietary Exposure 
The EPA considers several routes of exposure of exposure for the general 
population, including food, water, household uses, and public areas.  Since this 
research focuses only on crop uses for food commodities and because of the special 
difficulties of water exposure data, only food routes are explored. The data on 
drinking water is far less standardized than that for food.   The EPA uses several 
                                                
13 A summary of the EPA’s procedures for assessing human health risks is “Staff Background Paper 





models and sources of water monitoring data to assess dietary exposure through 
drinking water.  Since this research focuses on dietary exposure through food, and 
data points for water are quite disaggregated, drinking water exposure is omitted from 
this analysis. Household use of pesticides represents another route of exposure for the 
population, as does treatment of more public areas, such as golf courses or rights-of-
way.  There is also potential for exposure through commodities such as milk and 
pork, as pesticides are used on feed crops.   
Reregistration Decisions Affecting Dietary Risk 
As part of the reregistration process the EPA was required to assess the safety of each 
crop/active ingredient pair, and decide whether its use should be continued.  For each 
crop/AI pair they also reviewed the tolerance, and made adjustments to the pesticide 
residue limits (measured in parts per million) on commodities ready for consumption. 
 
Data Description 
Reregistration Decisions and Tolerance Changes 
Analysis of the effect of dietary risk on regulatory outcomes relies on data 
from the EPA and the USDA.  The two outcome variables indicating the 
reregistration decision and the change in tolerance originate from EPA publications.  
The reregistration outcome variable reflects the decision expressed in over 100 
Reregistration Eligibility Decisions covering food use pesticides, including 2722 
active ingredient/crop pairs.  It is a binary variable, and takes a value of zero for 




The second outcome variable is based on the change in published tolerances 
for pesticide residues, as published in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).  Under 
FQPA, the EPA was required to review the legal limit of pesticide residu  remaining 
on food crops.  These tolerances are published annually in the Federal Register (40 
CFR 180), and specified in parts per million. In theory, adjusting the tolerance 
changes the level of dietary risk, as it changes the maximum amount of pesticide that 
an individual ingests.  
Table 6:  Summary statistics for variables in dietary 
risk models 
Variable Units N Mean s.d.  Median 
Decision (zero if cancelled, one if 
reregistered) 
Binary 2722 0.812 0.390   
Tolerance change (% change in 
tolerance from 1994 to 2009) 
Percent 1163 0.334 3.368  0 
Tolerance decrease dummy Binary 1675 0.402 0.490   






1342 4.087 30.384  0.065 






1321 3.698 25.196  0.059 






1305 6.633 48.855  0.099 
Population dietary risk threshold (one 
if above threshold of concern) 
binary 1342 0.192 0.394   
Child dietary risk threshold (one if 
above threshold of concern) 
Binary 1321 0.184 0.388   
Infant dietary risk threshold (one if 
above threshold of concern) 
Binary 1305 0.239 0.427   
NAS infant (crops commonly 
consumed by infants per  
NAS report) 
Binary 2722 0.149 0.356   
NAS child (crops commonly 
consumed by children per  
NAS report) 
Binary 2722 0.115 0.319   
Probable carcinogen (classified as 
probable or known 
carcinogen by EPA) 
Binary 2722 0.192 0.394   



















1300 -4.597 6.637  -3.344 
Possible carcinogen (classified as 
possible carcinogen by EPA) 
Binary 2722 0.227 0.419   
Unknown if carcinogen (classified as 
“unknown if a carcinogen” by 
EPA) 
Binary 2722 0.127 0.333   
Non-carcinogen (classified as a non-
carcinogen by EPA) 
Binary 2722 0.455 0.498   
Tolerance in 1994 Parts per 
million 
1399 3.181 7.533  0.5 
Tolerance in 2009 Parts per 
million 
1546 2.734 5.829  0.5 





1855 0.025 0.102  0.010 




436 119.279 371.550  6.085 
Cancer risk >1:1,000,000 Binary 436 0.695 0.461   
Cancer risk > 1:10,000 Binary 436 0.188 0.391   





708 3.613 16.421  0.288 
Pesticide expenditures missing Binary 2722 0.740 0.439   
“Risk” measures are intended to be proportional to the EPA’s assessment of risk for individual 
pesticide uses. They are not necessarily bounded by 0 and 1. 
 
I record the tolerance in 1994, prior to the passage of FQPA, and in 2009, 
after the last RED in my sample was published, conditional on the use not being 
cancelled.  In theory, adjusting the tolerance changes the level of dietary rsk, as it 
changes the maximum amount of pesticide that an individual ingests. As the 
characteristics of crops and active ingredients vary widely, it is not appropriate to 
consider these tolerances in their raw form, but it is possible to calculate a percentage 
change in tolerance for 1163 observations.  This measure depends on both the 1994 




subset of the data.  In 1994, not all crop/AI pairs have a published tolerance, and in 
other cases, the tolerances were defined in crop groups that were difficult to ma ch 
perfectly to the 2009 data.   Since cancelled uses often do not have tolerances 
published, the data is further limited to crop/AI pairs that were reregistered.  Rather 
than rely on the percentage change in tolerance, I code whether the tolerance 
decreased (became more restrictive), increased (became less restrictiv ) or stayed the 
same. I divide the tolerance changes into three categories (Table7).  Most observed 
tolerance reassessments (890) resulted in no change, while 158 were reductions in 
tolerances and 104 were increases in tolerances.   
 
 
Table 7: Summary of Tolerance Changes between 
1994 and 2009 
Tolerance Action Frequency Percent 
Reduced 161 14% 
Unchanged 897 77% 
Increased 105 9% 
Total 1,163  




Carcinogenicity Measures  
 The EPA expresses the carcinogenicity of chemicals in a few ways.  It labels 
chemicals as known carcinogens, probable carcinogens, possible carcinogens, 
carcinogenicity unknown, and non-carcinogens (see Table 8) I use dummy variables 
for each of these categories, varying by active ingredient (Health Effects Division 
2007).  Probable and known carcinogens had the highest rate of reregistration, 




sample. Categories of carcinogenicity are not independently indicative of the dang r 
of a pesticide; these categories give no indication of the level of exposure of the 
individual.  
The EPA also uses a continuous measure of carcinogenicity, q*.  Following 
the formula in Equation  I derive a measure of lifetime cancer risk: 
 (    	
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Unfortunately, the availability of the q*, the dietary intake measure, and the 
tolerances from 1994 are all limited.  The EPA in some cases decided that the 
calculation of q* was unnecessary, and regarded the reference dose as sufficiently 
protective for carcinogenic as well as non-carcinogenic effects.  I can calculate only 
436 values for lifetime cancer risk.  Table 9 summarizes decisions by cancer risk 
levels, where lifetime risks exceeding one in a million are defined as being of 
concern. For the limited number of observations for which cancer risk measures are 
available, 88% of uses above the level of concern were reregistered, which exceeds 
the success rate of uses below the level of concern (83%) and the rate for the 
population of observations (81%). 
 
Table 8: Decisions by level of carcinogenicity 
   
 AI/crop pairs Pct. Reregistered 
Probable Carcinogens 522 97% 
Possible Carcinogens 617 78% 
Unknown Carcinogenicity 345 70% 
Non-carcinogens 1238 80% 
Total 2722 81% 
The 'Probable Carcinogen' category includes the one 'K own Carcinogen' in the sample, Diuron. 
Percent reregistered for probable carcinogens is significantly larger than that for any other group (at 





Table 9: Reregistration decisions for high and low 
levels of cancer risk 
   
 Obs. Pct. Reregistered 
Below level of concern  133 83% 
Above level of concern 303 88% 
Total 436 87% 
The EPA is concerned about cancer risks exceeding one in a million. Risks above this level are defined 
as of concern, risks below this level are not of concern. Percent reregistered above the level of concern 
is not significantly larger than the percent reregistered below the level of concern.  
 
Commodity Consumption Measure 
A second measure uses the data actually employed by the EPA to measure 
consumption.  Participants in United States Department of Agriculture Continuing 
Survey of Food Intake by Individuals (CSFII 1994-96, 98) survey in 1994-1996 
completed a two-day food diary.  Their consumption was translated to commodities, 
and tabulated for various demographic groups.  Not all crops with reregistration 
records were also recorded in the CSFII, which results in many missing values. 
 
Calculating Chronic Dietary Risk 
Chronic non-cancer dietary risk is a ratio of estimated total dietary exposure to a 
pesticide via a particular crop to the estimated safe level of consumption. I mimic the 
EPA’s measure as closely as possible with the data I have available.  Exposure is 
based on the mean daily consumption reported in the CSFII data for each commodity.  
This is multiplied by the 1994 tolerance for each active ingredient and crop pair, 
which represents a maximum legal limit of residue for each active ingredient and crop 




by the reference dose, or maximum safe daily exposure.  Intuitively, the resulting 
statistic represents estimated exposure as a percentage of safe exposure; therefore 
values over one would be in excess of safe exposure, while values under one would 
not exceed safe exposure.  
Sensitive Population Subgroups 
The Food Quality and Protection Act directed the EPA to be especially 
protective of demographic groups likely to be more vulnerable to pesticides.  These 
included infants, children, and pregnant women. The impetus for the extra concern 
stemmed from the National Academy of Sciences report, Pesticides in the Diets of 
Infants and Children (1993). One reason for the additional concern was that children 
are not little adults; the fact that they are developing means that pesticide exposure 
could affect them differently.  Second, children tend to eat a narrower range of food 
than adults, meaning that their diets concentrate on just a few commodities.  If these 
commodities have more pesticide residues, then children would have disproportionate 
exposure.  The National Academy of Sciences detailed the high-consumption 
commodities for both infants and children.  One dummy variable indicates high-
consumption crops for children, and another indicates high-consumption crops for 
infants.  Though these measures are crude, they do reflect the intention of the 
legislation. 
The CSFII data also included consumption figures by demographic group. 
The infant (between one and two years old) and child (between three and five years 
old) statistics are used to calculate chronic dietary risk in a similar fashion to the 




threshold of concern by population subgroup.  For all subgroups, uses with higher 
dietary risk were reregistered less frequently.   
  
Table 10: Reregistration decisions above and below 
levels of concern for population subgroups 
Subgroup Level of Concern Pct. Reregistered N 
Population Below threshold 85% 1,084 
 Above threshold 78% 258 
 Total 83% 1,342 
Children Below threshold 85% 1,078 
 Above threshold 74% 243 
 Total 83% 1,321 
Infants Below threshold 86% 993 
 Above threshold 75% 312 
 Total 83% 1,305 
One- and two-year-olds are classified as infants; children are aged 3-5 years. The level of exposure is 
assumed to be “above threshold” if daily exposure exce ds the maximum safe level, and “below 
threshold” if the exposure is less than the maximum safe exposure. For each group, the percent 
reregistered below and above the threshold are significa tly different from one another (at the 5% level 
for the population, 1% level for children and infants). 
 
Expenditures by pesticide use 
 
 Data on pesticide expenditures was provided by the ERS, and is a hybrid of 
price and quantity data collected by the National Agricultural Statistics Service and a 
private company. Quantities and prices are measured by the pound of active 
ingredient (net of other ingredients in pesticide products). Expenditure data is 
matched to a pesticide use if it is the most recent figure available no more than five 
years before publication of the RED. The scope of the data is necessarily limited by 
the surveys conducted by the government and by the company, and only about a 
quarter of the reregistration decisions in the dataset have corresponding expenditures 





Overview of Empirical Models and Estimation Methods 
Chronic Dietary Risk and Reregistration Outcomes 
To model the relationship between chronic dietary health risk from pesticide 
ingestion and reregistration outcomes, I begin with a naïve probit.  Reregistration 
outcomes, y, take a value of one when a use is reregistered and a value of zero when 
they are cancelled. Chronic population risk is x.  In all models, I assume the error 
term is normally distributed and correlated within the observations for each active 
ingredient.  
P*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The relationship between dietary risk and reregistration outcome does not have to be 
linear, however.  In fact, it seems reasonable that the EPA may have a threshold of 
risk, above which it would cancel more decisions.  To address this possibility, I use 
dummies for the quartiles of dietary risk in the probit. These quartiles are noted as the 
matrix R. 
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I am also interested in the relationship between reregistration outcomes and ri ks to 
infants and children.  I use both models above, substituting my measures of risk for 
infants and children.  
 The EPA had many factors to consider in making reregistration decisions, 
which could have been additional regressors in this model.  I omit most of them, 
however, as the EPA was explicitly directed not to trade off risks in benefits in 
assessing dietary risk.  If the EPA followed this directive, dietary risk should have 




factors such as the availability of substitute pesticides or occupational hazards.  Even 
though dietary risk should have been handled separately, I do include a measure of 
revenue from pesticide sales, s, to assess whether the value of the pesticide appeared 
to change how dietary risk was handled. 
 
Chronic Dietary Risk and Tolerance Changes 
 Cancellation of a pesticide use is a blunt policy instrument, but the EPA has 
other regulatory choices as well.  One of these choices is to adjust the tolerance for 
active ingredient/crop pairs.  Reducing tolerances should reduce risk, as this reduces 
the levels of residue allowed on food.  If the EPA decreased the tolerance, c tak s a 
value of 0; if the EPA did not change the tolerance, c takes a value of 1; and if the 
EPA increased the tolerance, c takes a value of two.  Cut points are noted as 6and 
67. I estimate the ordered probit model: 
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As with the probit models above, I can substitute risk measures for infants and 






Dietary Risk and EPA’s Reregistration Decisions 
In the probit models in Table 11, larger risks correspond to a lower probability of 
reregistration.  The use of Methomyl on peas, which is at about the 75th percentile (on 
the higher end of risk) of population risk, has a predicted reregistration of about 80% 
in Model 1. The use of Dimethoate on cotton, which is at about the 25th percentile (on 
the lower end of risk) of population risk, has a predicted probability of reregistration 
of 87%. The coefficients on population risk are significant at the 10% level.   
 Model 2 includes interactions between population risk and crops commonly 
consumed by infants and children, as defined by the National Academy of Sciences. 
There is no significant difference in the EPA’s treatment of these “child and infant” 
crops than of other crops. In Model 3, I use risk measures that are based on the actual 
consumption patterns of infants and children. These measures are highly correlated 
with one another and with population risk (correlations between 0.96 and 0.98), and 
are therefore highly collinear. In an effort to address this problem with collinearity, in 
Model 4 I interact a ratio of child to population consumption and infant to population 
consumption with population risk. These ratios place more focus on the differences 
between child and infant exposure, though the ratio variables are also highly 
correlated. The coefficients on the ratio variables are insignificant.  
 In Model 5, I add crop group dummies to account for unobserved 
characteristics of crop groups (such as tubers or stone fruits). The inclusion of these 
dummies makes no difference in the significance of the coefficients, and only a 





Table 11: Naive probit of reregistration decisions 
with chronic dietary risk by population subgroups 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
      
Log population risk -0.0150* -0.0145* -0.0055 -0.0165** -0.0202* 
 (0.0090) (0.0083) (0.0178) (0.0081) (0.0117) 
Infant*Log population risk  -0.0088   -0.0059 
  (0.0075)   (0.0069) 
Children*Log population risk  0.0050   0.0089 
  (0.0054)   (0.0057) 
Log child risk   -0.0197   
   (0.0211)   
Log infant risk   0.0093   
   (0.0251)   
Log of Population Risk* 
Child ratio 
   0.0005 
(0.0036) 
 
      
Log of Population Risk* 
Infant ratio 
   0.0005 
(0.0040) 
 
      
Crop group effects No No No No Yes 
Observations 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 
Marginal effects. Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient.   Outcome variable is one if the
pesticide use was reregistered, and zero if it was cancelled. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Only 
observations with data for all categories are included. The child ratio and infant ratio variables are 
highly correlated (0.85); however, coefficients on these variables are also insignificant when included 
separately in models (not shown). 
 
 In Table 12 I examine how dietary risk variables affect reregistration cross 
several groups: insecticide uses, fungicide uses, uses on fruits and vegetables, and 
uses on crops not categorized as fruits and vegetables. Insecticides and fungici es 
have higher levels of risk than herbicides, so I test whether the EPA was more 
responsive to risk in these two groups. The coefficient on population risk for both 
insecticides and fungicides is not significantly different than zero.   
 Risk values are also higher for fruit and vegetable crops than for other types of 
crops (such as grains and legumes). The EPA does not seem to cancel fruit and 
vegetable crops with higher risk values more often, however, as these coefficients are 




for other crops, as log of population risk has a negative significant coefficient of 
similar magnitude to models using the entire dataset. Table 12 provides no evidenc 
that the EPA was more protective of riskier active ingredient or crop groups. 
 
Table 12: Effect of dietary risk on reregistration by 
pesticide type and crop type 










     
Log population risk -0.0041 0.0146 -0.0125 -0.0204** 
 (0.0145) (0.0272) (0.0125) (0.0093) 
Infant*Log population risk -0.0127 0.0105 -0.0087 -0.0104 
 (0.0137) (0.0226) (0.0087) (0.0170) 
Children*Log population risk 0.0258* 0.00256 0.0035 0.0045 
 (0.0142) (0.0111) (0.0082) (0.0091) 
Constant 0.6681*** 0.8434*** 0.8872*** 0.6495*** 
 (0.2244) (0.3407) (0.1993) (0.1933) 
Observations 625 235 801 499 
Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient.  Fruits and vegetables include berry, citrus, 
pome, stone fruit, cucurbit, brassica, fruiting vegetables, tuber, bulb, and leafy crop groups. Models 
with only one risk variable as a regressor have similar coefficients (results not shown). *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Marginal effects. 
 
  
It may be more reasonable, however, to assume that the relationship between 
dietary risk and reregistration outcome is nonlinear. Perhaps there is a threshold 
above which the EPA cancels more uses. Or perhaps at low levels of toxicity, small 
differences in risk should not be material to the decision. I create dummies for the 
quartiles of infant and child dietary risk, where the fourth quartile is the highest risk. 
The first quartile, the safest, is excluded in the models in Table 13. Higher quartiles of 
dietary risk result in fewer reregistrations, with progressively larger eff cts for the 
higher quartiles. These coefficients are not individually significant; however, a Wald 




jointly equal to zero.  In Model 1, the quartile representing highest population risk is 
13 percentage points less likely to be reregistered than the lowest-risk quartile, though 
these coefficients are not individually significant. Model 2 and Model 3 have 
quartiles for infant and child chronic dietary risks. For measures of infant and child 
risk, none of the coefficients are significant. Higher levels of risk do have mor 
negative coefficients, however. A Wald test rejects the hypothesis that all the
coefficients are jointly equal to zero for infants, but not for the child quartiles.  
Table 13: Reregistrations and quartiles of dietary 
risk by population subgroup 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Population Quartile 2 0.0123   0.0140 
 (0.0529)   (0.0733) 
Population Quartile 3 -0.109   -0.114 
 (0.0707)   (0.0812) 
Population Quartile 4 -0.130   -0.0683 
 (0.0970)   (0.0941) 
Child Quartile 2  -0.0264  -0.0514 
  (0.0432)  (0.0578) 
Child Quartile 3  -0.0953  -0.0637 
  (0.0746)  (0.0861) 
Child Quartile 4  -0.155  -0.106 
  (0.0969)  (0.107) 
Infant Quartile 2   -0.0043 0.0359 
   (0.0367) (0.0623) 
Infant Quartile 3   -0.0861 0.0636 
   (0.0609) (0.0717) 
Infant Quartile 4   -0.140 0.0304 
   (0.0915) (0.0805) 
Constant 1.208*** 1.250*** 1.206*** 1.230*** 
 (0.346) (0.336) (0.314) (0.351) 
Observations 1300 1300 1300 1300 
Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Marginal 
effects. Category for the lowest percentiles is omitted. One- and two-year-olds are classified as infants; 
children are aged 3-5 years. Only observations withdata for all categories are included. Outcome 
variable is one if the pesticide use was reregistered, and zero if it was cancelled. 
 
 It is also possible to look at how EPA’s decisions varied above and below the 
dietary risk threshold. Population dietary risk threshold takes a value of one if 




infant risk threshold dummies are similarly constructed. In Table 14, the threshold for 
the population is not a significant determinant of reregistration. Coefficients on child 
and infant risk thresholds are marginally significant and the effects are of grater 
magnitude than the population threshold in Models 2 and 3. These coefficients 
suggest that the EPA suggesting that the EPA may have had a greater response to 
child and infant risks, with above-threshold values resulting in a greater than 10% 
reduction in the probability of reregistration. 
 Model 4 lends further support to the hypothesis that the EPA is more 
protective of children than of the population as a whole. When including all three risk 
threshold dummies, the child dietary risk threshold is significant at the 5% level, 
whereas the population threshold coefficient remains insignificant. Indeed, uses 
above the risk threshold for the population are reregistered 77% of the time, while 
uses above the risk threshold for children and infants are reregistered 73% and 75% 





Table 14: Reregistration decisions and dietary risk 
thresholds 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Population dietary risk threshold -0.0734   0.0822 
 (0.0599)   (0.0503) 
Child dietary risk threshold  -0.118*  -0.0993*** 
  (0.0633)  (0.0456) 
Infant dietary risk threshold   -0.107* -0.1106* 
   (0.0605) (0.0633) 
Constant 1.028*** 1.061*** 1.078*** 1.0781*** 
 (0.219) (0.219) (0.229) (0.2294) 
     
Observations 1300 1300 1300 1300 
Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Marginal effects. One- and two-year-olds are classified as infants; children are aged 3-5 years. Only 
observations with data for all categories are included. Outcome variable is one if the pesticide use was 
reregistered, and zero if it was cancelled. 
 
Congress instructed the EPA not to take pesticide benefits into account when 
making regulatory decisions based on dietary risk. Pesticide expenditures turn out to 
be quite important, however: the coefficient is highly significant across models. Use  
with half a million dollars more in pesticide expenditures are more than two percent 
more likely to get reregistered. The dietary risk coefficient is not sensitive to the 
inclusion of expenditures (though it may be affected by the differences in sample size 




Table 15: Registration decisions, dietary risk, and 
pesticide expenditures 
 (1) (2) 
   
   
Log population risk -0.0168** -0.0151* 
 (0.00797) (0.00912) 
Log of pesticide expenditures 0.0254*** 0.0289*** 
 (0.00873) (0.00986) 
Expenditures missing  -0.0832* 
  (0.0495) 
   
Observations 535 1300 
Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Marginal effects. 
Outcome variable is one if the pesticide use was reregistered, and zero if it was cancelled. 
 
Expenditures have a highly significant relationship with reregistration 
decisions in Table 15, but do these expenditures affect how the EPA accounts for 
dietary risk? In Table 16, I interact population risk with quartiles of expenditures, 
where the first quartile contains the lowest expenditure uses and the fourth quartile 
contains the highest expenditure uses. The highest quartile of uses by expenditure 
actually has the largest and most significant effect on reregistration decisions (Model 
1): the EPA appears to be most responsive to dietary risk when expenditures are high. 
In Model 2, coefficients on dummies for expenditure quartiles confirm that higher 
expenditures do increase the probability of consumption, while at the same time, 
higher dietary risk results in more cancellations within each quartile. In fact, the 
largest (if not most significant) response to dietary risk is still in the highest quartile 
of expenditure. 
Dietary risk is a function of how heavily a particular crop is consumed. 
Perhaps certain types of crops are widely consumed and widely produced, and have a 




groups to help account for this possibility, though this does not have much effect on 
the coefficient on dietary risk for the highest quartile of expenditure. The EPA 
appears to have applied its dietary risk assessment no less stringently to high 
expenditure pesticide uses than to low expenditure pesticide uses. 
Table 16: Reregistration decisions and dietary risk by 
expenditure quartile 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
    
Log of Population Risk*Expenditure Quartile 1 -0.00388 -0.0145 -0.0215** 
 (0.00792) (0.00949) (0.00948) 
Log of Population Risk*Expenditure Quartile 2 -0.021 * -0.0250** -0.0300** 
 (0.0120) (0.0118) (0.0128) 
Log of Population Risk*Expenditure Quartile 3 -0.0174 -0.0129 -0.0205* 
 (0.0106) (0.00969) (0.0112) 
Log of Population Risk*Expenditure Quartile 4 -0.054 *** -0.0386* -0.0481** 
 (0.0141) (0.0215) (0.0194) 
Expenditure Quartile 2  0.0230 0.0172 
  (0.0417) (0.0400) 
Expenditure Quartile 3  0.0789** 0.0761** 
  (0.0373) (0.0356) 
Expenditure Quartile 4  0.170*** 0.177*** 
  (0.0508) (0.0483) 
    
    
Constant 0.7900*** 0.5021*** 0.3751* 
 (0.1482) (0.1847) (0.2270) 
Crop group effects No No Yes 
Observations 708 708 708 
Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient. Quartile 1 is the quartile of lowest expenditure. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Marginal effects. Outcome variable is one if the pesticide use was 
reregistered, and zero if it was cancelled. 
 
Carcinogenicity and Regulatory Outcomes  
Cancer risk is the other significant dietary concern in pesticide reregistration.  The 
EPA classifies pesticides into categories of carcinogenicity, and Iinteract each of 
these categories with Log of Population Risk (Table 17). The coefficients suggest that 
for probable carcinogens, population risk has a greater effect on cancellation th n for 




significantly different than zero and significantly larger than the coeffici nts on the 
interactions for other categories. Though the coefficients change in Model 2 aftr
including expenditures, the inclusion in the model makes little difference to the 
interaction coefficients when a similar sample of data is used in Model 3.  
 
Table 17: Effect of population risk by carcinogenicity 
category on reregistration outcomes 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
    
Probable Carcinogen*Log of Population Risk -0.0768*** -0.0500** -0.0812*** 
 (0.0257) (0.0197) (0.0275) 
Possible Carcinogen*Log of Population Risk -0.00283 -0.00602 -0.00229 
 (0.0175) (0.0127) (0.0169) 
Non-Carcinogen*Log of Population Risk -0.0115 -0.0193** -0.0120 
 (0.0117) (0.00958) (0.0113) 
Unknown carcinogen*Log of Population Risk -0.0326 -0.0314 -0.0343* 
 (0.0203) (0.0202) (0.0207) 
Log of pesticide expenditures  0.0254*** 0.0278*** 
  (0.00848) (0.00917) 
Expenditures missing   -0.0851* 







Observations 1342 535 1342 
Probable carcinogen category includes one known carcinogen, Diuron. Robust standard errors 
clustered by active ingredient. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Marginal effects. Outcome variable is 
one if the pesticide use was reregistered, and zero if it was cancelled. 
 
A better variable for measuring carcinogenicity should be the q*, or lifetime cancer 
risk, which captures the number of expected cancer cases per million people exposed.  
Unfortunately, the q* is missing for most observations of pesticide decisions.  In 
Table 18 I present the results of models using q*, which is winsorized to mitigate the 
effects of outliers. Model 1 shows that higher cancer risk is associated with a higher 
probability of cancellation; however, this coefficient is insignificant and the effect is 
very small. At the median cancer risk of six cases per million people, an increase of 




0.05%. The second model recodes the missing values of log of cancer risk to zero, 
and adds a dummy variable indicating when the log of cancer risk is zero. In the third 
and fourth models, instead of a continuous measure of cancer risk, I generate 
dummies for two thresholds of cancer risk: one in 1,000,000 and one in 10,000. None 
of these coefficients is significant. 
 
 
Table 18: Reregistration decisions and cancer risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Log of cancer risk -0.00333 -0.0042   
 (0.0081) (0.0109)   
Cancer variable missing  -0.0710   
  (0.0984)   
Cancer risk > 1/1,000,000   0.0466  
   (0.0722)  
Cancer risk > 1/10,000    -0.0464 
    (0.0763) 
Constant 1.136** 1.136** 0.972* 1.154** 
 (0.479) (0.474) (0.545) (0.496) 
Observations 436 1342 436 436 
Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Marginal effects. Model (2) sets missing values of lifetime cancer risk to zero, and includes a dummy 
indicating the missing values. Lifetime cancer risk is winsorized to minimize the effect of outliers. 
Outcome variable is one if the pesticide use was reregistered, and zero if it was cancelled. 
 
Dietary Risk and Tolerance Changes 
The effects of dietary risk measures on whether a pesticide use is cancelled appear 
small, but the EPA may have mitigated risk through other channels.  One such 
channel is the pesticide tolerance: the EPA limits the amount of pesticide resi ue that 




higher level of safety. As part of the reregistration process, the EPA reviewed all 
tolerances for reregistered uses. I analyze whether dietary chronic health risk and 
dietary cancer risk predict a change in tolerances. 
 In Table 19 I use ordered probit models, where the outcome is zero if 
tolerances were reduced, one if they were unchanged, and two if they were increased.  
Population dietary risk, infant dietary risk, and child dietary risk all predict more 
restrictive tolerances, and coefficients on all of these measures are significant. Rather 
than cancelling pesticide uses in response to dietary risk, it appears that the EPA 
made adjustments to tolerances to reduce the risk. Log of population risk is 
significant across models, and changes little when pesticide expenditures are 
included. In Model 1, a 1% increase in population risk indicates that a use was 1.3% 
more likely to have its tolerance reduced or a 1% decrease in the probability of an 
increase in tolerance. The result is similar for infant and child risk measures in 
Models 2 and 3.  
 The sign on pesticide expenditures suggests that higher expenditures are 
correlated with more relaxed tolerances; however, these effects are both small and 
insignificant. In Model 5, a one percent increase in pesticide expenditures translates 
to just a 0.3% reduction in the likelihood that a tolerance will be reduced, and this 
result is insignificant. A one percent increase in pesticide expenditures indicates an 




Table 19: Tolerance changes and dietary risk by 
population subgroup 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Log population risk -0.0614**  -0.0533*** -0.0802*** -0.0652***  
 (0.0187) (0.0181) (0.0201) (0.0197) 
Infant*Log population risk  -0.0554   
  (0.0406)   
Children*Log population risk  -0.0249   
  (0.0287)   
Log of pesticide expenditures    0.0123 
(0.0341) 
Log of Population Risk*Child 
ratio 
  0.0109 
(0.0123) 
 
     
Log of Population Risk*Infant 
ratio 
  0.0027 
(0.0090) 
 
cut1     
Constant -0.918***  -0.928*** -0.919*** -0.917***  
 (0.169) (0.169) (0.169) (0.168) 
cut2     
Constant 1.522***  1.521*** 1.522*** 1.350***  
 (0.150) (0.151) (0.150) (0.140) 
Observations 1083 1083 1083 455 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, **  p < 0.01, ***  p < 0.001 
Outcome variable takes a value of zero if tolerance decreased, one if it stayed the same, and two if it 
increased between 1994 and 2009.  Conditional on succe sful reregistration. 
 
 Alternatively, I can examine whether values above and below a risk threshold 
resulted in a change in tolerance (Table 20). The coefficients are somewhat l ss 
significant than those on the continuous measures of dietary risk.  Population dietary 
risk values above the threshold of concern were 9% more likely to have their 
tolerances reduced than those below the threshold of concern.  
 The coefficient on log of population risk is also robust to the inclusion of crop 
group dummies (Model 2), so it does not seem likely that the effect of dietary risk is
driven by the characteristics of a few crops. I also look at the effect of log
population risk for insecticides and for fruits and vegetables. For fruits and vegetabls 




crops. For insecticides (Model 3), the EPA appears to be somewhat less responsive: 
the coefficient on log of population risk is both smaller and less significant than in 
other models. Though the coefficients on dietary risk are significant, they are not 
particularly large: a 10% increase in dietary risk translates to an increase in the 
probability of a tolerance reduction of less than half a percent. 
 
Table 20: Tolerance changes and dietary risk, 
alternative models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 




     




   
     
     
Log Population Risk  -0.0807*** -0.0489* -0.0773*** 
  (0.0264) (0.0255) (0.0253) 
     
Crop group effects No Yes No No 
cut1     
Constant -1.152***  -0.901*** -0.938*** -0.911*** 
 (0.158) (0.250) (0.216) (0.185) 
cut2     
Constant 1.264***  1.614*** 1.615*** 1.640*** 
 (0.118) (0.248) (0.222) (0.183) 
Observations 1083 1088 472 673 
Outcome variable takes a value of zero if tolerance decreased, one if it stayed the same, and two if it 
increased between 1994 and 2009. Conditional on succe sful reregistration. Standard errors in 
parentheses.  * p < 0.05, **  p < 0.01, ***  p < 0.001 Threshold dummies take a value of one if est mated 
exposure exceeds safe exposure, zero otherwise. Thrsholds for infant and child dietary risk (not 
reported here) are highly correlated with population risk (correlations of about 0.7 and 0.8). Entered 
separately in the model, their coefficients are very similar to those for the population. Fruits and 
vegetables include berry, citrus, pome, stone fruit, c curbit, brassica, fruiting vegetables, tuber, bulb, 
and leafy crop groups. 
 
 In Table 21, I break down the effect of dietary risk by level of expenditure. In 
the first model, dietary risk has a highly significant and negative effect on tolerance 
changes, whereas the coefficient on expenditures is not significantly different than 




tolerances is sensitive to expenditure, and find that the effect does vary. For every 
level of expenditure, higher levels of dietary risk are associated with lower, more 
protective tolerances. These coefficients are larger and more significant for the higher 
expenditure quartiles. It appears that the EPA did not give preferential treatment to 
high-expenditure uses in setting tolerances, but it is hard to say whether the strictn ss 
of the tolerance was commensurate with the risk. The higher quartiles of expenditur  
may have merited more regulation, as the mean value of population risk also 
increases for each quartile. 
 
Table 21: Tolerance changes and dietary risk by level 
of pesticide expenditure 
 (1) (2) 
   
   
Log of Population Risk*Expenditure Quartile 1  -0.022  
  (0.0188) 
Log of Population Risk*Expenditure Quartile 2  -0.0555** 
  (0.0242) 
Log of Population Risk*Expenditure Quartile 3  -0.0965*** 
  (0.0351) 
Log of Population Risk*Expenditure Quartile 4  -0.072 ** 
  (0.0317) 
Log population risk -0.0652***  
 (0.0197)  
Log of pesticide expenditures 0.0123  
 (0.0341)  
Cut1 -0.917*** -0.907*** 
Constant (0.168) (0.168) 
Cut2 1.350*** 1.368*** 
Constant (0.140) (0.144) 
Observations 455 455 
Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient.. Quartile 1 is the quartile of lowest expenditure; 






Using carcinogenicity categories rather than cancer risk increases the number 
of available observations (Table 22). I allow log of population risk to have a different 
coefficient for each category of carcinogenicity. Across models, non-carcinogens and 
unknown carcinogens are likely to have their tolerances reduced.  A 1% increase in 
population risk for non-carcinogens equates to a 1.8% increase in the probability that 
the tolerances will be reduced; for unknown carcinogens, the probability of a 
reduction in tolerance goes up by 2%.  The magnitude of the effect of population risk 
is smaller for possible carcinogens (1.3%) and less significant; probable carcinogens 
are actually less likely to have tolerance standards strengthened, though is 
coefficient is insignificant.  
 As in previous models, pesticide expenditures do not appear to have an effect 
on how the EPA responds to population risk. Though the coefficients in Model 2 are 
different than those in Model 1, this seems to be a result of how the expenditures data 
restricts the sample, as the coefficients in Model 3 with the larger subset of data are 





Table 22: Tolerance changes and carcinogenicity 
classification 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
    
Probable Carcinogen*Log of Population Risk 0.0124 0.00236 0.00885 
 (0.0252) (0.0373) (0.0258) 
    
Possible Carcinogen*Log of Population Risk -0.0633* -0.0437 -0.0630* 
 (0.0268) (0.0243) (0.0268) 
    
Non-Carcinogen*Log of Population Risk -0.0873***  -0.119***  -0.0891***  
 (0.0230) (0.0337) (0.0247) 
    
Unknown carcinogen*Log of Population Risk -0.0941**  -0.0881* -0.0977**  
 (0.0304) (0.0373) (0.0308) 
    
Log of pesticide expenditures  0.0137 0.0139 
  (0.0348) (0.0384) 
    
Expenditures missing   -0.140 
   (0.109) 
cut1    
Constant -0.938***  -0.921***  -1.022***  




   
Constant 1.544***  1.384***  1.464***  
 (0.155) (0.139) (0.152) 
Observations 1117 455 1117 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, **  p < 0.01, ***  p < 0.001 
Outcome variable takes a value of zero if tolerance decreased, one if it stayed the same, and two if it 
increased between 1994 and 2009. Conditional on succe sful reregistration. A Wald test fails to reject 
the null hypothesis that the interaction terms are jointly equal to zero. 
 
I also use ordered probit models to investigate the relationship between cancer 
risk and changes to tolerances (Table 23). The coefficients on cancer risk are negative 
in all models, indicating the EPA took a more protective action when cancer risk is 
higher. In Model 1, the coefficient on cancer risk indicates that one more cancer case 
per million in population results in 1% more probability of a reduction in tolerances, 
though this result is insignificant. Cancer risks above the EPA’s level of concern (one 




Model 3. Since only a subset of q* values are available, these results should be 
interpreted with caution. 
 
Table 23: Tolerance changes and log of cancer risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Log of cancer risk  -0.0470 -0.0484   
 (0.0282) (0.0292)   
     
Cancer variable missing  0.394*   
  (0.159)   
Cancer risk > 1/1,000,000   -0.393*  
   (0.168)  
Cancer risk > 1/10,000    -0.239 
    (0.279) 
cut1     
Constant -0.851***  -0.875***  -1.065***  -0.820***  
 (0.208) (0.158) (0.195) (0.218) 
cut2     
Constant 1.564***  1.615***  1.357***  1.579***  
 (0.176) (0.159) (0.168) (0.165) 
Observations 378 1163 378 378 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, **  p < 0.01, ***  p < 0.001 
Outcome variable takes a value of zero if tolerance decreased, one if it stayed the same, and two if it 




Many of the same factors affect both reregistration decisions and tolerance 
changes. These two models might be more efficiently estimated together. I employ a 
bivariate probit model to jointly estimate two outcomes: whether the pesticid  use 
was reregistered, and whether the tolerance was decreased. Cancelled us s were 
coded as decreased, as a cancellation implies that a tolerance will decrease to zero. 
Results of the bivariate probit are similar to those when the two models are run 
separately. In addition, rho is not significantly different than zero, implying that there 





Table 24: Bivariate probit of reregistration decisions 
and tolerance reductions 





   
Log population risk -0.0794** 0.113*** 
 (0.0365) (0.0303) 
Log of pesticide expenditures 0.109*** -0.0556* 
 (0.0249) (0.0313) 
Constant 1.052*** -0.443*** 
 (0.180) (0.147) 
   
Observations 534 534 
Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient. Rho is insignificant (-6.51, with an error of 
12.09). 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Conclusion 
 It appears that the EPA responded protectively to dietary health risks when 
regulating older pesticides through reregistration. There is limited evidence that 
dietary health risks spurred cancellations of pesticide uses. Higher levels of 
population risk predict lower reregistration rates, though these predictions are not 
highly significant. It seems likely that the EPA more often mitigated risk through 
adjusting pesticide tolerances than by eliminating pesticide uses. 
There is weak evidence that the EPA was more protective of infants and 
children than of adults in making reregistration decisions. Measures of dietary r sk 
that are specific to infant and child exposures have similar coefficients to populati n 
risk measures for both reregistration decisions and for tolerance changes. Crop  
commonly eaten by children did not have significantly different reregistration 




values for children and infants above the threshold of concern were 10% more likely 
to be cancelled than those below the threshold of concern. 
 Congress explicitly directed the EPA not to consider benefits of pesticides 
when assessing dietary risk. Though higher pesticide expenditures do have a highly 
significant and positive effect on reregistration, there does not appear to be any
tradeoff between pesticide expenditures and dietary risk, suggesting that the EPA 
followed Congress’ directive in this regard. 
 The importance of cancer risks in pesticide regulatory decisions is difficult to 
establish.  Probable and known carcinogens were more likely to be reregistered than 
possible carcinogens, unknown carcinogens, or non-carcinogens.  It appears that the 
EPA was more likely to cancel uses in response to the chronic dietary risks of 
probable carcinogens, yet non-carcinogens with higher chronic dietary risks were 
more likely to have their tolerances restricted. It should however, be noted tha these 
categories do not capture the extent of exposure to the pesticide. A cancer risk of 
more than one in a million resulted in a (slightly significant) 10% increase in the 
probability that tolerances would be restricted. A direct measure of cancer risk was 




Chapter 5: Occupational Hazards and Registrant and Grower 
Interests  
Introduction 
Pesticide use has material implications for human health, productivity, and profit. 
Farmers, pesticide manufacturers, and pesticide handlers all have interests in the 
availability of pesticides for agriculture16 and the rules governing their application, 
and their interests do not always intersect. CropLife America, a crop protection 
industry group, claims that “crop protection products increase productivity by 20-
50%” and that “farmers get back at least $14.60 for each $1 invested on fungicides.”  
Pesticides have significant economic value, but their use poses risks to the 
mixers, loaders, and applicators who handle the chemicals, as well as to other workers 
who perform tasks in treated areas. A recent study found that pesticide applicators 
have an elevated risk of certain cancers relative to other mortality risks (Waggoner, et 
al. 2011). As workers handle pesticides in concentrated form, and in much larger 
quantities than encountered by the general population, the potential for acute 
exposure is high. The range of possible health risks from handling pesticides is broad: 
there is suggestive evidence of neurologic effects, cancers, and reproductive effects,
among others (Weisenburger 1993).  
 The incidence of pesticide poisoning among agricultural workers is not well 
documented, making it difficult to draw broad conclusions about acute health effects. 
                                                
16 Here, pesticides refer to herbicides, insecticides, and fungicides applied to crops grown for food.  
The definition of pesticides is generally broader that this; I exclude many pesticide types, such as wood 
preservatives, antimicrobials, and rodenticides, as well as pesticide uses such as those for livestock, 




There are several reasons occupational pesticide illness would be underreported. 
Workers may not realize that illnesses stem from pesticide exposure, or have limited 
access to health care. Health care providers may not recognize pesticide poisonings, 
or may fail to report pesticide poisonings to the health department. Only a few stat s 
have significant systems in place for the surveillance of occupational pesticid  
poisoning (Schnitzer and Shannon 1999). The EPA’s role of protecting pesticide 
handlers and farm workers is all the more important due to the problems with 
monitoring health effects as pesticides are used. 
 
Pesticides and Worker Exposure 
Workers can be exposed to pesticides while performing a variety of tasks in the field. 
Depending on the pesticide and on the circumstances, farmers may handle their own 
pesticides or hire applicators to treat their fields. Pesticide handlers experience the 
most direct exposure to pesticide active ingredients. Mixers and loaders prepare the 
pesticide (often by diluting it in water or oil) and transfer it to the appropriate 
application equipment. The exposure to mixers and loaders is determined by the 
formulation of the active ingredient, the mixing and loading system they use, their 
level of protective equipment, and the quantity of active ingredient they handle. 
 Once the application equipment is ready, applicators treat the target area. 
Common application methods include aerial, where pesticide is distributed by 
airplanes or helicopters; ground application, where liquids or granules are spray d on 
the target area; chemigation, where pesticides are distributed through an irrigation 
system, and many types of hand application, where the applicator treats the area with 




amount of pesticide used, the method of application, the equipment used, and the 
amount of protective equipment used.  
 Other agricultural tasks may also result in pesticide exposure. Tasks such as 
thinning, weeding, scouting, and picking generally require workers to enter the field, 
though they do not typically wear protective equipment.  
 It is worth noting that there are many more possible scenarios of occupational 
exposure, including livestock treatments, in home extermination, treatment of food 
storage and processing areas, lawn treatments, and extermination. As this reearch 
focuses only on field treatment of food-use crops, other occupational exposures are 
not included. 
How FIFRA Treats Occupational Risk 
Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, health concerns 
stemming from occupational exposure can be balanced against the pesticide’s 
benefits. This differs fundamentally from the “reasonable certainty of no harm” 
standard established for dietary risk. It is to be expected, therefore, that grower 
interests would be taken into account when factoring in occupational risks. 
 
How the EPA Considers Toxicity of Pesticides in the Occupational Context 
Though much of the public’s concern about pesticide risk centers on dietary 
exposure, pesticide handlers experience higher rates of exposure than the general 
public. The EPA is concerned with cancer risk and non-cancer chronic health risk as 





The EPA uses dose-response models to estimate the 95th percentile of the dose 
response curve, or an upper estimate of how the probability of getting cancer changes 
with exposure to the chemical.  The q* (cancer cases per million of population per 
mg/kg-day of exposure) is multiplied by the exposure to yield cancer risk: 
 &  	




The EPA considers the estimated probability of cancer, or q*, to be not of concern if 
it is below one in a million (1 X 10-6).  
In addition, the EPA classifies chemicals into categories by carcinogenicity. It 
labels chemicals as known carcinogens, probable carcinogens, possible carcinogens, 
carcinogenicity unknown, and non-carcinogens. This data includes dummy variables 
for each of these categories, varying by active ingredient.  
Calculating Measures of Occupational Risk 
 The standard EPA measurement for occupational, non-cancer health risk from 
pesticides is Margin of Exposure, or MOE. The MOE compares estimated exposure 
with a “safe” level of exposure.  
 Calculating exposure requires several pieces of data. The EPA multiplies the 
application rate, or pounds of active ingredient per acre, times the number of acres 
likely to be treated by the handlers. The total pounds handled are multiplied by unit 
exposure, or the proportion of the pesticide expected to be absorbed by the handler 
(Keigwin 1998). It is then divided by body weight, which is assumed to be 70 
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While the actual calculation of the daily dose is simple, the underlying assumptions 
are less so. Maximum application rate is mandated by the EPA for each active 
ingredient, crop, and method. The EPA assumes that pesticides are applied at the 
maximum rate. The EPA may assume absorption of the pesticide by the worker to be 
100% or, if studies support it, a smaller number. Acres treated is based on data on 
application practices. 
Unit exposure is derived from the EPA’s Pesticide Handler Exposure 
Database (PHED), which is a repository of studies of worker exposure to active 
ingredients. Unit exposure depends on several parameters, which vary depending on 
whether the handler is a mixer/loader or an applicator, and takes different values for 
dermal and inhalation exposure. For applicators, selecting the relevant unit exposur 
depends on the application method and the level of protective equipment. Hand 
application has higher unit exposures than aerial application or groundboom 
applications. For mixers and loaders, unit exposure depends on the formulation of the 
pesticide, the mixing and loading system, and the level of protective equipment. 
Wettable powders, for example, have higher unit exposure for mixer/loaders than do 
liquids or granules. Since a use (active ingredient and crop pair) may have several
methods of application and formulations, there are several possible estimates of daily 
dose for each use (Office of Pesticide Programs 1998). 
To calculate the MOE, the EPA uses the daily dose and the No Observed 




experienced no adverse effects. The MOE is the ratio of the NOAEL to the daily 
dose: 
F    (3) 
It is important to note that in contrast to EPA’s measures of population risk (described 
in Chapter 4) higher values of MOE represent safer pesticide uses. The EPA 
considers MOEs below 100 to be of concern.  
 The MOEs in this paper use the chronic NOAEL, or levels of exposure that 
can be tolerated over a long period of time. It is also possible to calculate MOEs 
using acute NOAEL, a higher level of exposure that can be tolerated for a short 
period of time. For this dataset, the acute MOE and the chronic MOE are highly 
correlated (0.87 for applicator MOE and 0.77 for mixer/loader MOE), so there is not 
a large difference in what they measure. There are more observations of chronic MOE 
in my data, so this is the measure I use. 
 
Data Description 
Occupational Risk Mitigation Measures 
The EPA has several options for mitigating occupational risks from pesticides. Th  
most obvious instrument is cancellation. Though cancellation may be appropriate fo  
pesticides with relatively low economic benefits or that have good substitutes, there 
may be compelling reasons for a pesticide to remain available to a particular crop. If 
the pesticide use is to remain on the market, the EPA has the option to restrict the 










Table 25: Summary statistics for variables in 
occupational models 
Variable name Units N mean s.d. Media
n 
Reregistration decision (one if reregistered, 
zero if cancelled) 
Binary 2722 0.81 0.39  
Reentry interval Days 1931 2.60 6.96 1 
Dermal Toxicity Dummy (one if highly 
toxic) 
Binary 2722 0.12 0.33  
Inhalation Toxicity Dummy (one if highly 
toxic) 
Binary 2722 0.09 0.29  
Maximum application rate Pounds/acre 1861 3.05 5.55 1.56 
Acres per farm Acres 2339 69.40 117.19 29.0 





1855 0.025 0.102 0.01 
Handler MOEa (cNOAEL/(reported 
application rate*acres per farm)) 
Ratio of safe 
exposure/estima
ted exposure 
611 0.90 6.31 0.03 
Handler MOEa (cNOAEL/(maximum 
application rate*acres per farm)) 
Ratio of safe 
exposure/estima
ted exposure 
1405 0.75 4.26 0.03 
Applicator MOEa (cNOAEL/(unit 
exposure*CA application rate*CA 
acres per application)) 
Ratio of safe 
exposure/estima
ted exposure 
969 60.59 359.33 1.51 
Mixer/Loader MOEa (cNOAEL/(unit 
exposure*CA application rate*CA 
acres per application)) 
Ratio of safe 
exposure/estima
ted exposure 
649 14.02 267.00 0.01 
Mixer/Loader MOE Missing Binary 2722 0.76 0.43  
Applicator MOE missing Binary 2722 0.64 0.48  
ERS data missing (includes expenditures, 
price per acre, reported 
application rate) 
Binary 2722 0.74 0.44  
Handler cancer (reported application 
rate*acres per farm*qstar) 
Cancer cases 
per millionb 
245 2.47 5.16 0.33 
Handler cancer (maximum application 
rate*acres per farm*qstar) 
Cancer cases 
per millionb 
563 3.22 9.51 0.33 
Applicator cancer (applicator unit exposure 




385 13.15 132.93 0.01 
Mixer/loader cancer (mixer/loader unit 
exposure*CA application rate*CA 
acres per application*qstar) 
Cancer cases 
per milliona 
272 205.35 1626.02 0.43 
Substitute (number of additional pesticides 
available of the same type for the 
crop) 
count 2722 10.77 6.37 10 
Price per acre/max price per acre Percent 708 0.38 0.31 0.28 
Du Pont Binary 2722 0.11 0.32  
Bayer Binary 2722 0.13 0.34  
BASF Binary 2722 0.06 0.23  




Variable name Units N mean s.d. Media
n 
Syngenta Binary 2722 0.06 0.23  
Monsanto Binary 2722 0.06 0.23  
Expenditures Millions of 
dollars 
708 3.61 16.42 0.29 
cNOAEL (chronic no observed adverse 
effect level) 
Mg/kg-day 2336 16.18 46.47 1.8 
MOEs are not identical to EPA calculations, but should be proportional to EPA measures.  
aHandler MOE is calculated  without unit exposure, as there is no indication of application method or 
formulation in the ERS data to allow for matching to unit exposure. Mixer/Loader MOE and 
Applicator MOE do have this information, and do usenit exposure. Handler MOE is therefore less 
precise than Mixer/Loader MOE or Applicator MOE, and not directly comparable. 
bThough cancer measures mimic the EPA’s measure of cancer cases per million, my data limit the 
precision of this measure. It is more accurate to think of these measures as proportional to cancer cases 
per million rather than literally cancer cases per million. 
 
 One of the most direct ways the EPA can influence pesticide exposure is 
through the maximum application rate. For nearly all active ingredients, crops, and 
methods of application the EPA specifies a maximum number of pounds per acre that 
may be applied for one application and over the course of a year. Since the 
observations in my data do not vary by method, I selected the highest per acre value 
specified by active ingredient and crop in the Reregistration Eligibility Decision 
(RED). Unfortunately, maximum application rate does not make a good outcome 
variable for two reasons: first, values are reported only after the reregistration 
process; there is no observation of how the EPA changed the rate to mitigate risk. 
Second, application rate is an important component of occupational risk measures. 
Using it as an outcome, even when conditioning on reregistered uses, is problematic. 
 A second restriction set by the EPA is the reentry interval, which also varies 
by crop and active ingredient. This is the amount of time in days before workers not 
wearing protective clothing may reenter the field, and is not observed if the AI/crop 
pair was cancelled during the registration process. If the EPA’s concerns about the 




REIs in the data are a day or less, but they do range as high as 87 days. The 
importance of REIs varies by scenario; some crops require few tasks in the treated 
area, so a long REI matters little to production. Other crops benefit from pesticid  
application soon before harvesting. In this case, reducing the REI may have a 
negative effect on production. REI is observed only for pesticide uses that are 
reregistered. 
 The EPA may also specify PPE and engineering controls. The EPA usually 
starts with a base layer of nonspecialized clothing (shirt, pants, socks and shoes). For 
more toxic pesticides, the EPA will require more PPE, which may include gloves, 
aprons, protective headgear, protective footwear, and coveralls. In this data, there re 
three categories of PPE: only baseline clothing is required, baseline clothing plus 
gloves is required, or any additional PPE beyond gloves is required. Mixer/loaders 
and applicators may have different levels of PPE required for the same active 
ingredient and crop.  
 Additional protective measures that may be required by the EPA include the 
use of respirators and engineering controls. These are handled separately in the data 
from the PPE, with the respirator variable taking a value of one if handlers are 
required to use a respirator (not just have one handy). Engineering controls include 
mechanical safeguards such as enclosed cockpits for aircraft, enclosed cab  for 
ground equipment, and water soluble packaging. If at least one engineering control is 
required, the engineering variable takes a value of one; otherwise it is zero.  
 In my data, all variables describing protective measures vary only by active




PPE, engineering controls, and respirator requirements are observed only when the 
active ingredient is reregistered for use on some crops. 
Measures of Occupational Toxicity: Margin of Exposure 
 To match the EPA’s assessment of occupational risk, I would need a dataset in 
which risk varied by method of application and formulation. Many of the variables I 
use to construct the daily dose are approximations; because of this, I take three 
separate approaches to calculating daily dose. 
 Constructing a measure of the daily dose that corresponds both to the EPA’s 
methodology and to the structure of the regulatory outcomes data requires some 
simplification. At minimum, I need to know the amount of active ingredient a worker 
may encounter in a day. I use different data sources to approximate this exposur , 
which yield three separate measures, each with its own strengths and limitations. 
The Economic Research Service (ERS) of the USDA maintains a database of 
pesticide usage, which is a composite of the National Agricultural Statistics Service’s 
chemical usage data and Doane’s Countrywide Farm Panel Survey. The ERS data 
includes application rates reported in farm surveys. Since not all crops are surveyed 
every year, I select the nearest observation up to five years prior to the respective 
RED publication. This data has some significant drawbacks, however.  Application 
rate data is available for only 708 observations.  These observations are not 
representative of all the crops and active ingredients dataset, as the farm surveys 
focus on larger crops and widely-used pesticides. Second, the EPA’s calculation of 
risk is based on the maximum application rate, not the reported rate of use. If 




should be greater than the reported application rate. In the data, the actual applic tion 
rate is greater than the maximum rate for about a third of the observations, but does 
not necessarily indicate noncompliance. In some cases, maximum application rates 
are missing because no application listed in the RED was in compatible pounds/acre 
units. Maximum application rates reflect the rates set aft r reregistration, whereas use 
rates are recorded before reregistration. Measurement error in actual application rates 
could also be a factor. 
To complete the calculation of ADD in Equation 2, I need a value for the 
acres treated per day per worker.  The EPA does not publish detailed information on 
their assumptions, only some very broad guidelines that do not correspond directly to 
the crops in my data.  I choose instead to use a measure of acres per crop per farm, 
taken from the 1992 Agricultural Census.  My assumption is that the number of acres 
on a farm corresponds to the number of acres that an applicator would be likely to 
treat in a day.  The EPA assumes that the number of acres an applicator treats is he 
same as the number of acres for which a mixer/loader prepares pesticide (Evans, Jeff, 
email, December 27, 2010).  Unfortunately, since I cannot distinguish in the ERS data 
between formulas and methods, I cannot include the unit exposure.  I assume dermal 
absorption to be 100 percent.  Body weight is constant at 70 kilograms. 
It may be preferable to use the maximum application rate.  I collected these
application rates by active ingredient and crop from the REDs, including only the 
rates measured in pounds per acre.17  There are 1861 observations available, more 
than for the ERS data. Unfortunately, maximum application rates are not available for 
                                                
17 Pesticide usage may be on different scales, such as ounces per tree. Pounds per acre are the most 




cancelled uses, making it impossible to use this data to predict the overall 
reregistration decision.  I can and do use it when I model the REI, however.  As these 
application rates vary in the REDs by active ingredient, crop, and method of 
application, coding them required some simplification of the data: I chose the highest 
value of pounds per acre available for the active ingredient and crop pair. The lack of 
information on method and formula means calculating the ADD follows the same 
assumptions and has the same limitations as it did for the ERS data. The ERS data is 
sparse; only about a quarter of observations in the dataset have values for actual 
application rates. 
To better capture differences in exposure between mixers/loaders and 
applicators and differences in formulation or application method, I use the 1994 
Pesticide Use Report data from the California Department of Pesticide Regulation.  
California mandates that every agricultural application of pesticide be reported t  the 
state.  These reports include acres treated, pounds applied, formulation, active 
ingredient, crop, and whether the application was aerial or ground.  I use this data to 
calculate usage patterns by crop and active ingredient.  For mixers/loaders, I calculate 
the mean pounds per application for active ingredient i, crop j, and formula k, where 
N is the number of applications: 
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The exposure of mixers and loaders is determined largely by the formulation of the 




To calculate applicator exposure, I sum the mean pounds applied over l applications 
by active ingredient, crop, and method of application, m: 
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When a crop and active ingredient pair has more than one method or formulation 
available, I choose the one with the most reported applications. 
Using these means to calculate ADD in Equation 2 requires some important 
assumptions. First, I assume that California crop practices must be representative of 
national crop practices. In many cases, this data should be representative; in 1994, 
California was the leading producer of a large number of crops in the U.S., and had 
significant market share for several more.  However, the practices for some of the 
largest crops, including corn, soybeans, wheat, barley, and peanuts, may not be truly 
representative as California was not a leading producer of these commodities. Mor  
data tends to be available for applications on fruits and vegetables than on other types 
of crops. Second, this measure assumes that the quantity applied in a single 
application corresponds to the amount a worker would be exposed to in a day.   
 As the California data has the pounds per treatment, I do not have to rely on 
using acres per farm.  Also, since I have some information on formulation and 
method of application, I can use the unit exposures in calculating average daily dose 
in Equation 2 and define separate exposure measures for applicators and 
mixers/loaders. 
 For all of these data sources, I calculate an MOE as explained in Equation 3.  




Effects Division of the Office of Pesticide Programs, and is measured in 
milligrams/kilogram-day. The number of observations available are limited by the 
extent of overlap between the California application data and the reregistration data: 
fewer than 1000 for applicator MOE, and about 650 for mixer/loader MOE. 
Additional Measures of Occupational Hazard 
Margins of exposure (MOEs) form the foundation of the EPA’s assessment of 
occupational risk. In addition to MOEs, there are additional aspects of occupational 
hazard worth investigating: first, occupational cancer risk, and second, levels of 
inhalation and dermal toxicity.  
Cancer risk variables consist of the projected exposure of an applicator or 
mixer/loader multiplied by the q*. For example, the applicator cancer risk could be 
expressed as: 
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A similar calculation can be made for mixer/loaders. Unfortunately, q* data is sparse; 
it is only available for about a quarter of pesticide uses in the dataset. 
Pesticides are also classified as to their dermal and inhalation toxicity based 
on research on laboratory animals. Both have the same classification system: one for 




Table 26: Summary of occupational risk measures by 
reregistration decision 
 Cancelled Reregistered 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median 
Mixer/Loader MOE   103 16.028 0.006 547 13.620 0.018 
Applicator MOE  143 36.961 0.452 827 64.618 1.740 
Handler MOE (Reported Application Rate) 96 0.276 0.013 515 1.013 0.036 
Mixer/Loader Cancer (CA data) 32 45.195 0.019 240 226.703 0.503 
Applicator Cancer (CA data) 56 3.323 0.005 329 14.88 0.011 
Handler Cancer (Reported Application Rate) 41 3.049 0.108 204 2.356 0.355 
Higher MOE reflects a higher level of safety; higher cancer measures reflect lower levels of safety. 
Handler MOE is an approximation of the MOE calculated by the EPA, using national data on 
application rates, but without information on formulation or application method.  Mixer/loader MOE 
and Applicator MOE are calculated using reported pesticide applications in California, including 
formulation and application method data. 
 
Table 27 summarizes active ingredients by level of dermal toxicity and 
amount of required PPE for mixer/loaders; Table 28 does the same for applicators.18  
The pattern of PPE requirements suggests that the EPA uses PPE in response to 
dermal toxicity levels for mixer/loaders; 75% of highly toxic active ingredients 
require more PPE than gloves, whereas only 53% of nontoxic pesticides do.  The 
nontoxic category also has the highest proportion of active ingredients requiring no 
specialized PPE (26%). For applicators, higher proportions of pesticides require PPE 
beyond gloves when toxicity is higher; however the differences are less pronounced 
than for mixer/loaders.  Half of highly toxic pesticides require no PPE for applic tors. 
                                                
18 As PPE and dermal toxicity do not vary by pesticide use in the data, these tables are based only on 
active ingredients. Using all observations in the dataset would effectively weight the reported 




It may be the case that additional engineering controls, such as enclosed cabs, are 
mitigating risk to the point that PPE is not necessary: Table 29 suggests that this is 
true. For pesticides of either high dermal or high inhalation toxicity, the EPA requires 
engineering controls over 90% of the time. 
Most of the mitigation measures discussed here (PPE, engineering controls, 
and respirators) only vary in the data by active ingredient19, making them less useful 
for the regression models described later in the chapter. The descriptive statistic  do 
suggest, however, that PPE, engineering controls, and respirators are important to 
occupational risk mitigation. Models explaining reregistration decisions should 
therefore be interpreted with caution; it is possible that higher risk uses that were 
reregistered have significant PPE and equipment requirements. 
 
 
Table 27: Total pesticides and percent of pesticides by 
dermal toxicity ratings and mixer/loader personal 
protective equipment  






Highly Toxic 2 1 9 12 
Moderately Toxic 3 2 11 16 
Slightly Toxic 8 16 28 52 
Nontoxic 5 4 10 19 
Total 18 23 58 99 
     
Dermal toxicity and PPE data vary only by active ingredient, so only one observation per active 
ingredient is included.  Pesticides which had all uses cancelled are excluded, as PPE is only observed 
for reregistered pesticides.  Additional PPE may include aprons, protective footwear, or coveralls, but 
does not refer to engineering controls or respirators. 
 
 
                                                
19 In reality, respirator, engineering controls, and PPE requirements vary mostly by method of 




Table 28: Total pesticides by dermal toxicity ratings 
and applicator personal protective equipment 
Dermal Toxicity No PPE 
 




      
Highly Toxic  6 1 5 12 
Moderately Toxic  5 4 7 16 
Slightly Toxic  14 18 20 52 
Nontoxic  7 5 7 19 
Total  32 28 39 99 
Dermal toxicity and PPE data vary only by active ingredient, so only one observation per active 
ingredient is included.  Pesticides which had all uses cancelled are excluded, as PPE is only observed 
for reregistered pesticides.  Additional PPE may include aprons, protective footwear, headgear, or 




Table 29: Total pesticides by engineering controls 
and dermal and inhalation toxicity ratings 


















Highly Toxic 1 9 10 
Moderately Toxic 4 12 16 
Slightly Toxic 23 24 47 
Nontoxic 10 15 25 












Highly Toxic 1 11 12 
Moderately Toxic 1 15 16 
Slightly Toxic 27 25 52 
Nontoxic 9 10 19 
Total 38 61 99 
Dermal toxicity, inhalation toxicity, and engineering controls data vary only by active ingredient, so 
only one observation per active ingredient is included.  Pesticides which had all uses cancelled are 
excluded, as engineering controls is only observed for reregistered pesticides.  Engineering controls 
include a mandate for mechanical controls for at lest one use.  These controls may include closed 
mixing and loading systems (including water-soluble packaging), enclosed cockpits and enclosed cabs, 





Table 30: Total pesticides by inhalation toxicity and 
respirator requirements 
Inhalation Toxicity No Respirator Respirator Total 
    
Highly Toxic  6 4 10 
Moderately Toxic  8 8 16 
Slightly Toxic  34 13 47 
Nontoxic  18 7 25 
Total  66 32 98 
Pesticides which had all uses cancelled are excluded, as respirator requirements are only observed for 
reregistered pesticides. To be categorized as “respirator” there must be a respirator requirement for at 
least one use of the active ingredient. 
 
 
Since farm workers entering a field after application are not expected to use 
special equipment or wear PPE, the EPA relies on reentry intervals, or possibly 
maximum application rates, to protect them. Longer reentry intervals mean that farm 
workers wait longer before entering a field after application, giving the pesticide 
longer to break down and reducing exposure. Lower maximum application rates 
reduce exposure by decreasing the amount of pesticide used.  Table 31 summarizes 
reentry intervals and maximum application rates by level of dermal toxicity.  
Pesticides with high dermal toxicity have mean reentry intervals of about four days, 
whereas pesticides with moderate dermal toxicity have REIs of about nine days. 
These seem much more protective than the REIs for pesticides with slight dermal 
toxicity (1.5 days) and no dermal toxicity (0.9 days).  
Maximum application rates do not have such a clear pattern across levels of 
dermal toxicity. Rates for highly toxic and nontoxic pesticides are about the same (2.1 
pounds per acre) while moderately toxic and slightly toxic are 1.2 lbs/acre and 3.7 
lbs/acre, respectively. Whereas the cost of a higher reentry interval may be 




independent of the toxicity of the pesticide), more toxic pesticides might not require 
high rates of application to be effective.  Lower application rates for more toxic 




Table 31: Mean reentry interval and maximum 
application rate by level of dermal toxicity 
 REI Maximum Application Rate 
Dermal Toxicity N Mean (days) N Mean rate 
Highly Toxic 161 4.2 163 2.1 
Moderately Toxic 250 9.0 242 1.2 
Slightly Toxic 1273 1.5 1226 3.7 
Nontoxic 247 0.9 230 2.1 
Total 1931 2.6 1861 3.1 





Grower interest would be best captured by a projection of economic losses to growers 
following a cancellation or other regulatory change to a pesticide use. The EPA 
calculated losses occasionally, but not often enough or systematically enough to be 
useful in this analysis. Therefore, I use variables that should be correlated with 
whether a change would have an effect.  
If a substitute exists for a cancelled or more stringently regulated pesticid , 
then the burden of the cancellation on growers should be less. I count how many 




assumes that any new herbicide applied to corn could substitute for an existing 
herbicide applied to corn. This is often not true, as there is variation in the target 
weeds of herbicides, even just for a single crop. This variable also captures nothing 
about the relative effectiveness of pesticides (or how the effectiveness could vary 
based on the pest and other circumstances.) 
Even if there are substitute pesticides available, it could be that they are far
more expensive than the one being regulated. Even though growers may be able to 
maintain yields after a cancellation, it might be at a much higher cost. I attempt to 







If the pesticide has the highest per acre price compared to other pesticides of th  ame 
type h applied to crop j, Relative price is unity. Relative price is limited to the number 
of observations available from the ERS data: about 700. 
Major Pesticide Registrants and Pesticide Revenues 
 Pesticide registrants pursue reregistration to protect the profits earned from the 
marketing of pesticides. One measure of the importance of a particular pesticide use 
to a registrant is the amount of revenue it generates. I approximate this revenue by 
constructing an Expenditures variable, the product of the prices and pounds of 
pesticides reported in the USDA-ERS dataset of pesticide usage. Because data is not 
available on every pesticide and crop combination for every year, I select the most 




allows for a long process of economic assessment and publication, and may not be 
unreasonable as the EPA would also have been using similar data.   
Using expenditures as a proxy for revenue requires some notable assumptions: 
first, that revenue and expenditures are the same (what growers report spending is 
equal to, or at least proportional to, what registrants receive). The second assumption 
is that the expenditures in the USDA-ERS database are representative of exp nditures 
for pesticide uses generally. Data tend to be collected only for larger crops and more 
widely used pesticides, so there is some chance that available values of the 
explanatory variable may restrict the observations systematically, and th t some 
characteristic of pesticide uses that determines their exclusion from the USDA-ERS 
data is also correlated with the error term.  
 Constructing a variable for profits was unfortunately not feasible. I do not 
know production costs. The costs associated with pursuing reregistration of a 
pesticide use, though significant, proved too difficult to obtain. Registrants were 
required to pay reregistration fees to the EPA, fund studies to meet the EPA’s data 
requirements, and bear associated internal administrative costs. Information on all of 
these types of costs is not readily available. The few data points I did find 
(reregistration fees and examples of study costs) were so few and so limited in scope 
as to be unusable in estimating models.  
 Another proxy for the value of a pesticide to a registrant would have been its 
patent protection. Identifying which patents were still in effect proved challenging: 




them was not practical. It is of some comfort that the pesticides studied here are 
decades old, and have perhaps exhausted the benefits of patent protection. 
 Consolidation in the pesticide industry has resulted in a few registrants with 
large market shares. In each RED, the EPA identifies the ‘technical registrant’ who 
pursues reregistration for the active ingredient.20 I have identified the pesticides 
registered by six major firms, and use dummy variables to identify each of these firms 
in the data: Du Pont, Bayer, BASF, Syngenta, Monsanto, and Dow.21 
Overview of Empirical Models 
Relationship between Occupational Hazards and Regulatory Outcomes 
I examine the effect of occupational risk variables on whether a pesticide use 
is reregistered using a probit model similar to that in Chapter 4. Reregistration 
outcome, y, takes a value of one when a use is reregistered and a value of zero when it 
is cancelled for each active ingredient i and crop j. Occupational risk (MOE) is w. 
Variables representing the interests of growers, such as relative prices of pesticides 
and availability of substitutes, are G. Registrant interest and sway in the decision 
process is R, which includes pesticide expenditures and dummy variables for 
individual registrants. In all models, I assume the error term is normally distributed 
and correlated within the observations for each active ingredient. 
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20 In most cases, there was just one technical registant listed in the RED. The identity of the registrant 
is still assigned to a major company if the company is listed in the RED, even if the registration is 
shared.   
21 Though multiple companies may market the same active ingredient, these dummies identify the 




 The other outcome variable of interest when considering occupational risk is 
the reentry interval (REI), or number of days after application the EPA permits 
workers to enter the field. The REI varies widely between pesticide uses, but i  
censored at 0.5 days. I therefore use a Tobit model to allow for a latent variable, d*. 
 
d$%  a d$%
  if d$% 2 0.50.5 if d$%  d 0.5e  (9) 
 
I estimate the following model, using the same covariates as in the probit model 
above. 
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As REI is only observed for reregistered uses, this model is estimated conditional on 	
  1. 
 
Results 
Reregistration Decisions and Occupational Risks 
 To find whether occupational risks have bearing on pesticide reregistration 
decisions, I construct three different risk variables. The first, Log of Handler MOE, is 
a general measure of occupational risk not specific to the function of the pesticide 
handler, and is limited by the availability of application rates from the USDA-ERS 
data. Higher values of MOE reflect a higher level of safety.22   
 Table 32 includes effects of handler MOE on reregistration decisions. The 
positive coefficient on log of handler MOE suggests that pesticides safer to handlers 
are more likely to be reregistered. This coefficient is not, however, significa t, even 
                                                
22 This differs from the dietary risk variables in Chapter 4, where higher values correspond to higher 




after including a larger sample in Model 2 or after the inclusion of expenditures or 
dietary risk.  
Table 32: Reregistration decisions and pesticide 
handler MOE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Log of Handler MOE (actual application rate) 0.0085 0.0088 0.0124 0.0021 
 (0.0136) (0.0142) (0.0135) (0.0130) 
ERS data missing  -0.0445   
  (0.0626)   
Log of pesticide expenditures   0.0350***  
   (0.00896)  
Log of population risk    -0.0136** 
    (0.00638) 
     
Constant 1.1383*** 1.1383*** 1.4595*** 1.0057*** 
 (0.3380) (0.3375) (0.3988) (0.3658) 
Observations 611 1997 611 464 
Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient. Higher MOE corresponds to a lower level of 




 The addition of grower and registrant covariates in Table 33 changes neither 
the sign nor the significance of handler MOE. The availability of additional substitute 
pesticides is positively associated with reregistration, though the coefficient is not 
significant. Higher values of the Log of price variable indicate a relativ ly more 
expensive pesticide. In Model 2, more expensive pesticides are less likely to be 
reregistered. If the reregistration process favored less expensive pesticides, it could 
indicate the EPA put some weight on grower concerns. 
 Model 3 includes registrant variables. Higher expenditures on pesticides, 
which should correlate to registrant revenues, result in a significantly higher 




in part by the fact that registrants would only have incentive to support economically 
valuable pesticides through the reregistration process. It also may reflect gistrants’ 
persistence in getting pesticide uses reregistered. To see if some registrants appeared 
to hold more sway over the EPA’s decisions, I include dummies for five of the major 
pesticide firms. Monsanto was 100% successful in reregistering the pesticid  uses in 
this dataset, and is therefore excluded from the model.  
 
Table 33: Reregistration decisions and handler MOE 
with grower and registrant covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
    
Log of Handler MOE (actual application rate) 0.0112 0.00979 0.0105 
 (0.0115) (0.0123) (0.0100) 
Log of pesticide expenditures   0.0332*** 
   (0.00805) 
Du Pont   -0.181 
   (0.227) 
Bayer   -0.286* 
   (0.165) 
Syngenta   0.00626 
   (0.0844) 
BASF   -0.0509 
   (0.0997) 
Dow   0.0202 
   (0.0846) 
Substitute 0.00443   
 (0.00548)   
Log of price per acre/max price per acre  -0.0522*  
  (0.0295)  
    
Constant 0.9018* 0.8662** 1.7263*** 
 (0.5532) (0.3864) (0.2641) 
Observations 611 611 611 
Marginal effects. Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Outcome variable takes a value of one if reregistered, zero if cancelled. All uses for Monsanto were 
reregistered, so the Monsanto dummy is excluded. 
 
 Table 34 presents results for variables specific to applicators, using data from 
the California Department of Pesticide Regulation. Applicator MOE has a positive 




reregistered, but this coefficient is insignificant. The coefficient on applicator MOE is 
similar in Model 2 after increasing the sample, still insignificant, and the coefficient 
on the dummy for missing data is also insignificant.  
 The EPA defined MOE below 100 as being of concern, and above 100 as not 
being of concern. The data here do not map to the EPA’s scale, making it impractical 
to test MOE>100 and MOE <100. Instead, I examine whether the EPA treated 
quartiles of applicator MOE differently from one another. There is some reason to 
believe that they did. Quartile 1, the highest risk quartile, is excluded from the 
models. Quartiles 2-4 have positive coefficients, suggesting that the EPA cancelled 
more ‘riskier’ uses than ‘safer’ uses.  
 California is a leading producer of many crops, but may not have 
representative data for corn, barley, peanuts, soybeans, oats, and wheat, important 
crops of which it is not a major producer. In Model 4 I exclude these crops, as the 
exposure measures may not be representative of application practices. This exclusion 





Table 34: Reregistration decisions and applicator 
MOE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Applicator MOE Quartile 2   0.0773* 0.0772* 
   (0.0447) (0.0446) 
Applicator MOE Quartile 3   0.0810* 0.0802 
   (0.0492) (0.0506) 
Applicator MOE Quartile 4   0.0736 0.0699 
   (0.0827) (0.0846) 
Log of Applicator MOE (CA data) 0.00977 0.0115   
 (0.0107) (0.0130)   
CA Applicator Missing  -0.0641   
  (0.0517)   
     
Constant 1.0526*** 1.0526*** 0.7786*** 0.7854*** 
 (0.1960) (0.1955) (0.2208) (0.2259) 
Observations 969 2722 969 919 
Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Marginal effects. The lowest quartile is omitted, which represented the highest risk. Model 4 excludes 
corn, barley, peanuts, soybeans, oats, and wheat, as California was not a leading producer of these 
crops. Outcome variable is one if the pesticide use was reregistered, and zero if it was cancelled. 
 
 
 In Table 35 I report results for applicator MOE with registrant and grower 
variables. Though the coefficients on the safest quartiles (Quartile 3 and Quartile 4) 
remain positive, the estimates are sensitive to the inclusion of additional variables, 





Table 35: Reregistration decisions and applicator 
MOE with grower and registrant covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Applicator MOE Quartile 2 0.0764 -0.00803 0.0701 -0.0416 
 (0.0486) (0.0548) (0.0474) (0.0529) 
Applicator MOE Quartile 3 0.0795 0.0429 0.0775 0.0125 
 (0.0510) (0.0597) (0.0512) (0.0650) 
Applicator MOE Quartile 4 0.0715 0.0548 0.0722 0.0689 
 (0.0732) (0.0795) (0.0829) (0.0565) 
Log of pesticide expenditures    0.0362*** 
    (0.0121) 
Du Pont    -0.183 
    (0.232) 
Bayer    -0.361** 
    (0.177) 
Syngenta    -0.0483 
    (0.118) 
BASF    -0.118 
    (0.131) 
Substitute -0.000488    
 (0.00429)    
Log of price per acre/max price per acre  -0.0481 -0.0406  
  (0.0338) (0.0325)  
ERS data missing   0.0658  
   (0.0573)  
     
Constant 0.8131** 0.6455** 0.5292* 1.599*** 
 (0.3832) (0.2776) (0.2712) (0.2981) 
Observations 969 354 969 354 
Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All uses for Monsanto were reregistered, so the Monsanto dummy is excluded. Outcome variable is 
one if the pesticide use was reregistered, and zero if it was cancelled. 
 
Mixer/loader MOE 
 Mixer/loaders perform different tasks than applicators, with different 
implications for exposure. The EPA assumes that mixer/loaders handle the same 
quantities of active ingredient as applicators in given scenarios, but mixer/loader 
exposure depends more on formulation of active ingredients, whereas applicator 





 Like applicator MOE, however, mixer/loader MOE is insignificant (Model 1 
of Table 36). Adding a dummy variable for missing observations does not change 
this. I cannot identify which of my observations have MOE smaller than 100 on the 
EPA’s scale, but I can examine whether different quartiles of risk have differing 
effects of reregistration decisions. Quartile 1, the highest risk, is excluded from 
Models 3 and 4. All the remaining quartiles have positive coefficients, implying that 
safer pesticide uses for mixer/loaders were more likely to be reregistered. Quartiles 2 
and 3 are 10% more likely to be reregistered than Quartile 1. The estimates are robust 
to removing unrepresentative crops from the sample in Model 4. 
  
Table 36: Reregistration decisions and mixer/loader 
MOE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Mixer/Loader MOE Quartile 2   0.104** 0.107** 
   (0.0513) (0.0519) 
Mixer/Loader  MOE Quartile 3   0.109** 0.0973* 
   (0.0550) (0.0584) 
Mixer/Loader MOE Quartile 4   0.0663 0.0605 
   (0.0915) (0.0965) 
Log of Mixer/Loader MOE (CA data) 0.00358 0.00399   
 (0.0135) (0.0150)   
CA Mixer/Loader Missing  -0.0548   
  (0.0758)   
     
Constant 1.0655*** 1.0655*** 0.6890*** 0.7047*** 
 (0.3647) (0.3632) (0.2374) (0.2477) 
Observations 649 2722 649 617 
Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Marginal effects. Quartile 1 is omitted, which reprsents the highest risk group.  Model 4 excludes 
corn, barley, peanuts, soybeans, oats, and wheat. Outcome variable is one if the pesticide use was 
reregistered, and zero if it was cancelled. 
 
 
 The number of substitute pesticides available, as in previous models, is not a 
significant predictor of reregistration success. It also does not materially affect the 




pesticides are less likely to be reregistered in Model 2. The change in the quartil  
coefficients between Model 1 and Model 2 seems likely to be the result of the 
reduced number of observations available. Model 4 has the same issue. 
 
Table 37: Reregistration decisions and mixer/loader 
MOE with covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Mixer/Loader MOE Quartile 2 0.103** 0.0189 0.0976* 0.0277 
 (0.0520) (0.0516) (0.0528) (0.0499) 
Mixer/Loader MOE Quartile 3 0.105* 0.0531 0.0994* 0.0526 
 (0.0563) (0.0634) (0.0562) (0.0611) 
Mixer/Loader MOE Quartile 4 0.0590 -0.0104 0.0645 0.0432 
 (0.0904) (0.113) (0.0934) (0.0654) 
Log of pesticide expenditures    0.0287** 
    (0.0116) 
Du Pont    -0.283 
    (0.304) 
Bayer    -0.284* 
    (0.160) 
Syngenta    -0.0528 
    (0.120) 
BASF    -0.141 
    (0.161) 
Substitute -0.00149    
 (0.00347)    
Log of price per acre/max price per acre  -0.0608* -0.0589  
  (0.0367) (0.0360)  
ERS data missing   0.0731  
   (0.0640)  
     
Constant 0.7921** 0.6059** 0.4010 1.4723*** 
 (0.3645) (0.2855) (0.2701) (0.3698) 
Observations 649 258 649 258 
Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient. . *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All uses for Monsanto and Dow were reregistered, so their dummies are excluded. Outcome variable is 




Including both mixer MOE and applicator MOE in the same model decreases 
the number of observations available for estimation. It is possible, however, that there 
is a difference in the treatment of mixer/loader and applicator risk. In Model 1 of 




values of applicator MOE result in more reregistrations, whereas safer values of 
mixer MOE result in more cancellations (though this coefficient is insignificant). It is 
possible that the EPA is more protective of applicators than of mixers and loaders, but 
it is also possible that mixer/loader risk was simply mitigated in other ways. 
Engineering controls such as closed mixing and loading systems substantially reduce
risk for mixers and loaders, but not for applicators. Unfortunately, changes in these 
requirements are not easily observed at the use level, and are not included in the 
models.  
Model 2 includes the measure of population dietary risk from Chapter 4. 
Measures of MOE are somewhat correlated with dietary risk (correlations are about 
0.35).  The inclusion of dietary risk does not change the sign of either applicator or 
mixer/loader MOE, but appears to increase the magnitude of both of them. In this 
case, however, the MOE coefficients are sensitive to the reduction in observations 
that results from the inclusion of dietary risk, rather than the inclusion of dietary risk 
itself (results not shown).  
Effects of MOE on reregistration decisions for insecticides (Model 3) and 
fruits and vegetables (Model 5) are not remarkably different than for the full sample. 








Table 38: Reregistration decisions and occupational 
MOE, alternative specifications 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   Insecticides  
only 
 Fruits and  
vegetables only 
      
Log of Applicator MOE 0.0338* 0.0504** 0.0231 0.0310 0.0381* 
 (0.0192) (0.0247) (0.0209) (0.0189) (0.0231) 
Log of Mixer MOE -0.0216 -0.0387 -0.0006 -0.0209 -0.0286 
 (0.0221) (0.0268) (0.0166) (0.0215) (0.0252) 
Log of Population Risk  -0.0054    
  (0.0064)    
Constant 0.6730 0.3276 1.0141*** 0.4743 0.5407 
 (0.4591) (0.5526) (0.3969) (0.5548) (0.4833) 
Crop group effects No No No Yes No 
      
Observations 645 430 363 642 454 
Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient. Marginal effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Outcome variable is one if the pesticide use was reregistered, and zero if it was cancelled. Fruits and 
vegetables include berry, citrus, pome, stone fruit, c curbit, brassica, fruiting vegetables, tuber, bulb, 




Mixer/Loader and Applicator MOE and Expenditures 
Table 39 gives effects of applicator and mixer/loader MOE on reregistration 
decision by quartile of expenditure. Because higher MOE values represent a less risk, 
positive coefficients indicate protective action by the EPA. For the first two models 
with mixer/loader MOE, the coefficients are not significant save for the highest 
quartile of expenditure, which is negative.  The EPA was less responsive to MOE for 
the highest quartile of expenditure, which is consistent with the EPA trading off 
occupational hazard with the economic value of the pesticide. Applicator MOE in the 
highest quartile of pesticide expenditure in Models 3 and 4 also has a negative 








Table 39: Reregistration Decision and Applicator and 
Mixer MOE by Quartile of Expenditure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
      
Exp. Quartile 1*Log of Mixer MOE 0.0099 0.0077   0.0 42 
 (0.0083) (0.0084)   (0.0102) 
Exp. Quartile 2*Log of Mixer MOE 0.0061 0.0043   -0.0 04 
 (0.0065) (0.0066)   (0.0097) 
Exp. Quartile 3*Log of Mixer MOE -0.0011 -0.0034   -0.0019 
 (0.0077) (0.0079)   (0.0087) 
Exp. Quartile 4*Log of Mixer MOE -0.105*** -0.104***   -0.125*** 
 (0.0360) (0.0340)   (0.0390) 
Exp. Quartile 1*Log of Applicator MOE   0.0282** 0.256** 0.0129 
   (0.0133) (0.0128) (0.0139) 
Exp. Quartile 2*Log of Applicator MOE   0.0203** 0.172 0.0126 
   (0.0103) (0.0111) (0.0118) 
Exp. Quartile 3*Log of Applicator MOE   -0.0039 -0.0 75 0.0006 
   (0.0139) (0.0150) (0.0115) 
Exp. Quartile 4*Log of Applicator MOE   -0.0207** -0.0253** 0.0511*** 
   (0.0097) (0.0118) (0.0190) 
Constant 0.9874*** 0.5930 1.0529*** 0.6700** 0.9580*** 
 (0.2242) (0.3773) (0.1918) (0.2988) (0.2295) 
      
Crop group effects No Yes No Yes No 
Observations 649 646 969 960 649 
Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient. Outcome variable is one if the pesticide use was
reregistered, and zero if it was cancelled. Number of observations differ due to number of missing 
values and also because crop group dummies perfectly predict the outcome in some cases (and these 
observations are dropped). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Marginal effects. 
 
 
Mixer/loader Cancer Effects 
 None of the three measures of cancer risk has a significant association with 
pesticide reregistration (Table 40) and all coefficients are very small. Though it is 
possible that cancer risk was not a major factor in the EPA’s decisions, it seems lik ly 
that the few observations available for handler exposure and cancer risk are simply 






Table 40: Reregistration decisions and occupational 
cancer risk 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
    
Handler cancer risk (reported application rates) -0.0016   
 (0.0085)   
Log of applicator cancer risk  -0.00043  
  (0.0145)  
Log of mixer cancer risk   0.0145 
   (0.0179) 
    
Constant 0.9014*** 1.0472*** 1.3394*** 
 (0.1931) (0.2671) (0.3273) 
Observations 490 385 272 
Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient.  Marginal effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 




Re-entry Intervals and Handler MOE 
 In addition to concerns about risks to pesticide handlers, the EPA should also 
take into account the safety of other workers who may encounter pesticides in the 
field. To protect these workers, the EPA restricts entry to the field after pesticide 
application. In Table 41 I use two versions of handler MOE to see if occupational 
safety was a factor in setting REIs. The first uses actual application re data from 
ERS. This offers some insight based on actual usage patterns, but has relatively few 
data points.  The second uses maximum application rates set by the EPA as part of the 
reregistration process, which should more closely track some “maximum” level of 
exposure. Since reentry intervals are not reliably available for cancelled p sticide 
uses, I restrict the data to those uses that survived the reregistration process. The 
EPA’s lowest (and apparently, default) REI appears to be 0.5 days. As nearly half the 




MOEs were constructed for pesticide handlers, so their assumptions do not 
apply perfectly to other farm workers. In particular, the assumption that handlers 
might apply pesticides to an entire farm’s acreage does not seem to be appropriate f r 
tasks such as weeding or picking. Because I do not have a flawless measure of ri k 
for agricultural workers who are not handlers, I examine several variables 
approximating occupational risk.  
 Higher (safer) levels of handler MOE have lower reentry intervals in Table 41 
for both types of application rate data. A one percent increase in handler MOE 
predicts a reduction in REI of 1.6 days. Coefficients are robust to expenditures. 
Though the dummy for missing data in Model 2 is significant (and indicates that the 
missing pesticide uses have REIs seven days longer), the coefficient on handler MOE 
changes little with the larger sample. In addition, handler risk using maximum 
application rates is not so restricted in its observations, and has a similar coefficient in 




Table 41: Reentry intervals and handler MOE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Log of Handler MOE (actual application rate) -1.640** -1.597** -1.695**  
 (0.801) (0.770) (0.830)  
ERS data missing  6.940**   
  (3.289)   
Log of pesticide expenditures   -0.307  
   (0.258)  
Log of Handler MOE (using maximum application rates)    -1.498** 
    (0.688) 
Constant -8.296* -7.925* -8.782* -6.544* 
 (4.388) (4.125) (4.669) (3.487) 
     
Sigma 10.94** 10.51*** 10.93** 10.35*** 
 (4.313) (4.052) (4.307) (3.954) 
     
Observations 476 1451 476 1385 
Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Reentry interval measured in days. Tobit model used, as nearly half of the reentry intervals are 12 
hours. Conditional on reregistration. 
 
 As handler MOE using maximum application rates has a similar coefficient to 
risk using reported rates (and has more observations) I use the former in Table 42. 
Substitute is marginally significant in Model 1, though the sign is difficult to explain. 
Pesticide uses with more substitutes have longer reentry intervals. If the EPA is 
responding to grower interests, it would seem more likely that uses with fewer 
substitutes would have longer intervals, as there would be no alternatives when there 
are time-sensitive tasks to complete in the field. Relative price of the pesticid  has no 
significant effect. 
 Registrant dummies also have no significant effect, nor do expenditures. Quite 




Table 42: Reentry interval and handler MOE with 
covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
    
Log of Handler MOE (using maximum application rates) -1.420** -1.531** -1.763* 
 (0.712) (0.729) (0.924) 
Log of pesticide expenditures   -0.295 
   (0.275) 
Du Pont   2.927 
   (3.108) 
Bayer   -3.640 
   (6.323) 
Syngenta   -6.819 
   (7.181) 
BASF   -1.071 
   (4.179) 
Dow   -2.490 
   (4.534) 
Monsanto   -5.158 
   (5.177) 
Substitute 0.272*   
 (0.160)   
Log of price per acre/max price per acre  2.402  
  (1.661)  
Constant -12.25** -4.722 -8.653* 
 (6.059) (3.179) (4.464) 
    
Sigma 11.03** 10.71*** 11.00*** 
 (4.367) (4.081) (4.189) 
    
Observations 469 469 469 
Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Reentry interval measured in days. Tobit model used, as nearly half of the reentry intervals are 12 
hours. Conditional on reregistration. 
 
 As with the handler MOE variables discussed above, applicator MOE is an 
imperfect stand-in for risks to other farm workers. However, these MOE variables 
were constructed assuming that applicators would not wear protective equipment, 
which farm workers also do not. As applicator MOE is increasing in safety, safer 
pesticide uses have significantly shorter REIs. This is a similar result to that found 





Table 43: Reentry intervals and applicator MOE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Log of Applicator MOE (CA data) -0.944* -0.935** -1.047* -0.975* 
 (0.484) (0.470) (0.539) (0.503) 
CA Applicator Missing  -2.271   
  (1.418)   
Log of pesticide expenditures   -0.0749  
   (0.179)  
Constant -0.159 -0.0790 -2.411 -1.393 
 (1.348) (1.242) (1.734) (1.397) 
     
Sigma 10.28** 10.05*** 10.73*** 10.41*** 
 (4.104) (3.805) (4.121) (3.968) 
     
Observations 772 1931 541 1772 
Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Reentry interval measured in days. Tobit model used, as nearly half of the reentry intervals are 12 
hours. Model 4 excludes corn, barley, peanuts, soybeans, oats, and wheat. Conditional on 
reregistration. 
 
 The coefficient on applicator MOE does not change much with the inclusion 
of grower and registrant variables. Having more substitute pesticides available m kes 
reentry intervals rise (the opposite result of that in Table 42) whereas relative price of 
the pesticide to its substitutes has no significant effect. None of the registrant 




Table 44: Reentry interval and applicator MOE with 
grower and registrant covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
    
Log of Applicator MOE (CA data) -0.820* -0.987** -1. 29* 
 (0.435) (0.493) (0.583) 
Log of pesticide expenditures   -0.0474 
   (0.190) 
Du Pont   2.398 
   (2.421) 
Bayer   -0.369 
   (3.860) 
Syngenta   -6.498 
   (7.212) 
BASF   0.508 
   (3.514) 
Dow   -1.426 
   (3.699) 
Monsanto   -8.404* 
   (5.019) 
Substitute 0.242**   
 (0.110)   
Log of price per acre/max price per acre  2.001  
  (1.425)  
Constant -4.062* 0.668 -1.808 
 (2.342) (1.896) (2.235) 
    
Sigma 9.986*** 10.44*** 10.64*** 
 (3.789) (3.893) (3.988) 
    
Observations 1931 541 541 
Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Reentry interval measured in days. Tobit model used, as nearly half of the reentry intervals are 12 
hours. Conditional on reregistration. 
 
Re-entry Intervals and Mixer/Loader MOE 
 The final option for assessing the relationship between REI and occupational 
risk is to use mixer/loader MOE. Like applicator MOE, it does not assume that 
protective clothing is worn. In Table 45, mixer/loader MOE has a significa t and 
negative effect on REI, meaning that safer pesticide uses are more likely to r ceive 
less restrictive reentry intervals. A one percent change in mixer/loader MOE predicts 




expenditures, a dummy for missing observations, and the exclusion of possibly 
unrepresentative crops. 
 
Table 45: Reentry intervals and mixer/loader MOE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Log of Mixer/Loader MOE (CA data) -1.212** -1.187** -1.339 * -1.243 ** 
 (0.589) (0.563) (0.736) (0.613) 
CA Mixer/Loader Missing  3.212   
  (2.186)   
Log of pesticide expenditures   -0.057  
   (0.410)  
Constant -5.536 -5.252* -8.057 -5.768 
 (3.438) (3.138) (4.855) (3.579) 
     
Sigma 10.50** 10.01*** 13.45*** 10.72*** 
 (4.203) (3.800) (5.602) (4.336) 
     
Observations 516 1931 206 489 
Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Reentry interval measured in days. Tobit model used, as nearly half of the reentry intervals are 12 
hours. Conditional on reregistration. 
 
 Grower and registrant covariates (Table 46) have similar coefficients to those 
reported with applicator MOE in Table 44. Having an additional substitute pesticid  
available increases the reentry interval by a few hours, while relative price and 




Table 46: Reentry interval and mixer/loader MOE 
with grower and registrant covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
    
Log of Mixer/Loader MOE (CA data) -0.665** -0.832* -0.980* 
 (0.326) (0.450) (0.535) 
Log of pesticide expenditures   0.107 
   (0.209) 
Du Pont   2.952 
   (2.443) 
Bayer   -0.0623 
   (3.762) 
Syngenta   -7.358 
   (7.218) 
BASF   0.377 
   (3.546) 
Dow   -2.099 
   (3.770) 
Monsanto   -7.140 
   (4.471) 
Substitute 0.195**   
 (0.0962)   
Log of price per acre/max price per acre  1.922  
  (1.375)  
Constant -4.429* -0.705 -3.159 
 (2.464) (2.022) (2.381) 
    
Sigma 10.01*** 10.35*** 10.50*** 
 (3.808) (3.780) (3.836) 
    
Observations 1931 541 541 
Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Tobit model used, as nearly half of the reentry intervals are 12 hours. REI censored at 0.5 days. 
Conditional on reregistration. 
 
 
In Table 47, I model the effects of both applicator MOE and mixer/loader 
MOE on the reentry interval. Applicator MOE is not significant across models, 
including the models for fruits and vegetables only and insecticides only. 
Mixer/loader MOE is negative, implying that safer levels of MOE will have lower, 
more protective reentry intervals, though these results are not significant across 




MOE, suggesting a decrease in reentry interval of about 1.5 days for a 10% increase 
in MOE.  
 
Table 47: Reentry Interval and Applicator and Mixer 
MOE, alternative models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 





     
Log of Applicator MOE -0.568 -0.623 -0.594 -0.515 
 (0.448) (0.435) (0.513) (0.482) 
Log of Mixer MOE -0.749* -0.806* -0.721 -1.029** 
 (0.408) (0.426) (0.479) (0.443) 
Constant -3.578 -8.369** -3.719 -2.760 
 (2.504) (3.365) (2.749) (2.167) 
Crop group effects No Yes No No 
Sigma 10.51** 10.10*** 11.41** 11.66** 
 (4.192) (3.791) (4.731) (4.718) 
Observations 513 513 358 287 
Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient. Marginal effects. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Reentry interval measured in days. Tobit model used, as nearly half of 
the reentry intervals are 12 hours. Fruits and vegetabl s include berry, citrus, pome, stone fruit, 
cucurbit, brassica, fruiting vegetables, tuber, bulb, and leafy crop groups. 
 
 
 Coefficients on MOE are generally negative in Table 48, suggesting that the 
EPA reduced reentry intervals in response to higher levels of occupational hazard at 
all levels of pesticide expenditure. Though some of these effects are significant n the 
middle quartiles of expenditure, they are never significantly different than zero at the 





Table 48: Reentry interval and mixer/loader and 
applicator MOE by level of expenditure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
      
Exp. Quartile 1*Log of Mixer MOE -0.732 -0.676   -0.264 
 (0.643) (0.524)   (0.461) 
Exp. Quartile 2*Log of Mixer MOE -0.639* -0.575*   -0.116 
 (0.326) (0.330)   (0.283) 
Exp. Quartile 3*Log of Mixer MOE -0.426 -0.488*   0.374 
 (0.275) (0.272)   (0.390) 
Exp. Quartile 4*Log of Mixer MOE -0.527 -0.601   -0.0130 
 (0.582) (0.527)   (0.443) 
Exp. Quartile 1*Log of Applicator MOE   -1.390 -1.32 * -1.273** 
   (0.862) (0.743) (0.623) 
Exp. Quartile 2*Log of Applicator MOE    -1.245** -1.362** -1.122* 
   (0.570) (0.607) (0.591) 
Exp. Quartile 3*Log of Applicator MOE   -0.650** -0.792** -1.436 
   (0.321) (0.359) (0.917) 
Exp. Quartile 4*Log of Applicator MOE   -0.756 -0.819 -1.033 
   (0.578) (0.537) (0.739) 
Constant -1.248 -4.605 -0.476 -2.466 -0.539 
 (1.988) (2.932) (1.439) (2.553) (1.717) 
Crop group effects No Yes No Yes No 
Sigma 11.00** 10.64*** 10.51** 10.22*** 10.92** 
 (4.378) (3.962) (4.231) (3.886) (4.340) 
Observations 516 516 772 772 516 
      
      
Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient.  Reentry interval measured in days. Tobit model 
used, as nearly half of the reentry intervals are 12 hours. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Marginal 
effects. 
 
Reentry Interval and Cancer Risk 
 Higher levels of cancer risks are associated with higher (and more protective) 
REIs across measures of occupational risk, though these effects are largely 
insignificant. A one percent increase in handler cancer risk corresponds to an incre se 
in REI of almost a day, though the effects for other cancer measures are considerably 
smaller.  As with all the cancer risk variables presented here that rely on q*, relatively 





Table 49: Reentry interval and cancer risk 
 (1) (2) (2) (3) 
     
     
Handler cancer risk (using reported application rates) 0.9241*    
 (0.6576)    
Handler cancer risk (using maximum application rates)  0.6905   
  (0.4728)   
Log of applicator cancer risk   0.332  
   (0.271)  
Log of mixer cancer risk    0.117 
    (0.175) 
Constant -12.788* -9.4562 0.699 -0.762 
 (9.1668) (6.3905) (1.359) (1.230) 
     
Sigma 13.86** 5.288** 4.846*** 3.731*** 
 (2.056) (1.700) (1.415) (1.343) 
     
Observations 162 558 322 238 
Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient.  Reentry interval measured in days, and censored 
at 0.5 days. Conditional on reregistration. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Conclusion 
Using several measures of MOE, I examined whether occupational health concerns 
predicted pesticide cancellation or reentry restrictions. Though the data and 
assumptions behind the MOE measures were different, the results for Handler MOE, 
Applicator MOE, and Mixer/Loader MOE were similar. Linear measures of MOE do 
not have significant coefficients. Due to data limitations, I could not identify the 
EPA’s threshold of concern in the data, and test if uses with MOEs above that level 
were treated differently than uses with MOEs below that level. Analysis of quartiles 
of MOEs suggests that higher levels of risk correspond to more cancellations.  
 It appears that the EPA did mitigate occupational risk through other means, 
however. MOEs were at least marginally significant predictors of REI, with higher 




 Cancer risk had few significant coefficients, possibly due to the limited 
availability of cancer data. Higher cancer risk is associated with longer REI, though 
these results are at best marginally significant.  
 Registrant dummies had mostly insignificant coefficients for REI models. For 
reregistration decisions, most dummies were also insignificant, save for Baye . Bayer 
fared considerably worse in the reregistration process. 
The relative price of a pesticide to other pesticides of the same type used on 
the same time was a slightly significant predictor of reregistration. Relatively cheap 
pesticides were less likely to be cancelled, which is consistent with the EPA 
protecting grower interests. Number of substitute pesticides of a particular ype and 
use is a significant predictor of REI. More available substitutes are associ ted with 
more restrictive REIs, also consistent with the protection of grower interests.  
 Personal protective equipment, respirators, and engineering controls are 
additional requirements the EPA can set on pesticide use to mitigate risk. Generally, 
there are a higher proportion of these requirements when pesticides are of higher 






Chapter 6:  Additional Factors Influencing Pesticide Decisions  
 
Introduction 
In addition to occupational and dietary risk factors and the particular registrant and 
grower concerns explored in Chapter 5, there are numerous other factors that could 
have influenced pesticide reregistration decisions. Registrants’ interest and motives 
may have been driven by whether there were substitute pesticides in their 
development pipeline. Media coverage of individual pesticides could have attracted 
public attention and influenced regulatory decisions. The EPA could have paid 
special attention to smaller crops, which, it was feared, would suffer disproportionate 
cancellations under reregistration due to registrants’ unwillingness to support them. 
Empirical strategy 
Reregistration Outcome 
Similar to Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, I employ a probit model predicting 
whether a particular use was successfully reregistered (in which case it t kes a value 
of one) or cancelled (taking a value of zero). All models have errors clustered by 
active ingredient. 
Tolerance Changes 
 In an ordered probit model similar to that described in Chapter 4, I use an 
outcome variable that captures the direction of the tolerance change. Positive 
coefficients imply more relaxed tolerance levels, whereas negative coefficients imply 




pesticide is reregistered, cancelled uses are excluded from these models. All models 
have errors clustered by active ingredient. 
 
Data Description 
Reregistration Decisions, Tolerance Changes, and Reentry Intervals (REIs)
I use the outcome variables described in more detail in Chapter 4 and Chapter 
5: decision (whether the pesticide use was reregistered) and tolerance change 
(whether the tolerance for the residue of the pesticide on a particular crop was 
relaxed, strengthened, or remained the same). 
Media Variables 
 There are three measures of media coverage of pesticides. A Lexis-Nexis 
search of each pesticide name (and its variants, when appropriate) yielded listings of 
articles from three national news outlets: USA Today, The New York Times, and The 
Washington Post. For each outlet, I created a count of the number of articles 
appearing on a particular pesticide over the five years prior to the publication of the 
pesticide reregistration decision (RED).23 These allow for both count variables (USA 
Today articles, New York Times articles, and Washington Post articles) as well as 
dummy variables for any media mention within a source (USA Today dummy, New 
York Times dummy, and Washington Post dummy), and a dummy for any mention in 
any source (Any article). Permethrin had the most mentions, with 21 in the Postprior 
                                                
23 I made no distinction between articles that discused pesticides in a negative light, those that 
discussed them in a more positive light, or those that were mentioned in passing (though anecdotally, 
several of them were negative in tone). It is perhaps more accurate to characterize these variables as 
measuring the extent to which a particular pesticide might have penetrated the public consciousness, 




to its RED. The Post had the most articles on pesticides of the media outlets, with 
1.20 articles per pesticide compared to 0.81 for the Times and 0.26 for USA Today. 
One-third of pesticides had at least one article prior to the publication of their REDs. 
Looking at these averages across the whole sample (with several observations per 
pesticide) gives a different picture. The Post had 2.25 articles per pesticide compared 
to 1.99 for the Times and 0.33 for USA Today. Over half the observations in the full 





Table 50: Summary statistics for variables included 
in pipeline active ingredient, media mention, and 
minor use models 
Du Pont, Bayer, BASF, Dow, Syngenta, Monsanto, Washington Post articles, USA Today articles, New 
York Times articles, and Any article vary only by active ingredient. Minor and Average acres planted 
vary only by crop.  
 
Anticipated Active Ingredients 
 Major pesticide registrants have a pipeline of new active ingredients. It is 
possible that some registrants did not pursue the reregistration of certain uses, 
Variable name Units N Mean s.d. Median 
Reregistration decision Binary 2722 0.81 0.39  
Tolerance change (% change in 
tolerance from 1994 to 
2009) 
Percent 1163 0.334 3.368 0 
ERS data missing Binary 2722 0.74 0.44  
Du Pont Binary 2722 0.11 0.32  
Bayer Binary 2722 0.13 0.34  
BASF Binary 2722 0.06 0.23  
Dow Binary 2722 0.09 0.29  
Syngenta Binary 2722 0.06 0.23  




708 3.61 16.42 0.288 
Washington Post articles Number 
of 
articles 
2720 2.26 4.02 0 
USA Today articles Number 
of 
articles 
2720 0.33 1.08 0 
New York Times articles Number 
of 
articles 
2720 1.99 3.53 0 
Any article Binary 2722 0.55 0.50  
Minor binary 2722 0.72 0.45  






Population risk  1342 4.09 30.38  




knowing that they would produce a new product (presumably more profitable, due to 
its patent protection) to substitute for it.  
 A list of newer active ingredients came from the EPA’s website.24 These 
active ingredients were categorized as to their type (whether they wer  herbicides, 
insecticides, or fungicides).  To get a list of relevant pesticide uses, I consulted the 
Code of Federal Regulations (40 CFR 180) to find which uses of the pesticides had 
current tolerances. A current tolerance, in most cases, indicates an active registration 
for the named crop.25  In cases where crop groups, rather than individual crops, were 
listed, I expanded the data to include the relevant crops.  For example, when the EPA 
lists a “pome fruit” tolerance, I assume that pears and apples both have registration . 
                                                
24 The list of new registrations was accessed in 2009, and a comparable list does not appear to exist on 
the EPA’s site at this time. 
25 In few cases, the CFR lists tolerances when there are no domestic registrations, so that there is a 
standard for imported food that may have been treated with the pesticide. It is possible, therefore, that 




Table 51: List of newer pesticide registrations with 
primary registrant, year of registration, and type 
New Active Ingredient Registration year Registrant Type 
AZOXYSTROBIN 1997 Syngenta Fungicide 
CARFENTRAZONE-ETHYL 1998 FMC Herbicide 
CLORANSULAM-METHYL 1997 Dow Herbicide 
DIFLUFENZOPYR 1999 BASF Herbicide 
FIPRONIL 1996 Bayer Insecticide 
FLUFENACET 1998 Bayer Herbicide 
FLUMIOXAZIN 2001 Valent Herbicide 
FORAMSULFURON 2002 Bayer Herbicide 
GAMMA-CYHALOTHRIN 2004 Pytech Insecticide 
INDOXACARB 2000 DuPont Insecticide 
ISOXAFLUTOLE 1998 Bayer Herbicide 
MESOTRIONE 2001 Syngenta Herbicide 
PYRACLOSTROBIN 2002 BASF Fungicide 
S-METOLACHLOR 1997 Syngenta Herbicide 
SPINOSYN A 1997 Elanco Insecticide 
SULFENTRAZONE 1997 FMC Herbicide 
THIAMETHOXAM 2000 Syngenta Insecticide 
TRALKOXYDIM 1998 Syngenta Herbicide 
TRICLOPYR 2002 Dow Herbicide 
TRIFLUSULFURON-METHYL 1996 DuPont Herbicide 
 Active ingredient list was sourced from EPA’s website in 2009, but does not appear to be on their site 
in this form any longer.  Only active ingredients fir t registered after 1996 (when FQPA was passed) 
are included. 
 
 I then match the new active ingredients to the active ingredients subject to 
reregistration by crop and type. In cases where a new active ingredient with the same 
crop use and type became registered during the reregistration period, I assign a value 
of one to the ‘pipeline’ variable.26 Those uses without a match were assigned zero. 
Minor uses 
At the time of FQPA, one of the concerns of growers and legislators was whether 
smaller crops would have their uses supported. Managing the reregistration process 
                                                




and providing the necessary data (which can include crop-specific studies) may not be 
worthwhile to registrants of uses that are not very profitable. The EPA was to give 
special consideration to minor uses, and the hardships that their cancellations could 
cause growers. The Interregional Research Project #4 (IR-4), a cooperati n of state 
experiment stations and federal agencies, supported the reregistrations and data 
collection of some minor crops.27 The EPA defined about 30 crops as “major” crops, 
leaving the remaining crops categorized as “minor” (EPA's Minor Use Team and 
Public Health Steering Committee n.d.). I construct a dummy for these “minor” crops. 
 In addition, I use data on acres planted from the USDA as a continuous 
measure of crop size. 
Additional Covariates 
 The measure of dietary risk, Log of population risk,  described in more 
detail in Chapter 4. It is a ratio of a “safe” level of pesticide exposure to estimated 
exposure. Higher values represent a higher level of safety.  
Log of pesticide expenditures and Expenditures missing are also discussed in 
Chapter 4. Expenditures are price per acre multiplied by pounds per acre by active 
ingredient and crop. When expenditures are missing, they are recoded to zero and a 
second variable, expenditures missing, indicates this recoding. 
 
                                                
27 A more detailed discussion of IR-4’s role is part of he Encylopedia of Agrochemicals, and is 







 Major news outlets appear to have a limited effect on the EPA’s pesticide 
decisions. Table 52 gives results for probit models predicting reregistration decisions 
for pesticide uses; dummy variables for each news outlet publishing an article on a 
particular pesticide do not have significant coefficients. These three dummies are 
correlated with each other, though running separate models for each outlet also does 
not result in significant coefficients (results not shown). These dummies are also 
jointly insignificant. 
 Model 3 uses a count of articles for each outlet within five years before the 
RED. The count for USA Today is significant at the 10% level, and suggests that 
more media coverage resulted in less chance of reregistration. USA Today had fewer 
articles mentioning pesticides than the other news outlets, so it is possible that the few 
articles it did carry were more relevant to pesticide safety. 
 Model 4 tests a dummy (Any article) that measures whether any outlet 
reported on the pesticide, and is also insignificant. 
 I cannot rule out the possibility that news outlets report on more risky 
pesticide uses, which would have been cancelled by the EPA regardless of coverage. 
Pesticide uses had almost the same likelihood of having a news article mentioning he 
active ingredient if they were cancelled (54%) as if they were reregistered (55%). The 
number of articles with mentions is also not statistically different between 
reregistered and cancelled pesticide uses. None of the news outlet dummies is 




dietary risk variable in Model 2 changes neither the significance nor the sign of these 
dummies, indicating that the news outlet coverage is not just a signal of risk. 
Table 52: Reregistration outcomes and media 
mentions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Log population risk  -0.0137*   
  (0.00826)   
Washington Post dummy 0.0423 0.127   
 (0.121) (0.115)   
USA Today dummy -0.0876 -0.0207   
 (0.171) (0.156)   
New York Times dummy -0.0075 -0.162   
 (0.123) (0.133)   
Washington Post articles   0.0212  
   (0.0132)  
USA Today articles   -0.101*  
   (0.0532)  
New York Times articles   0.0079  
   (0.0083)  
Any article    0.0072 
    (0.0832) 
     
Constant 0.8658*** 0.8809*** 0.8210*** 0.8705*** 
 (0.1872) (0.2805) (0.1823) (0.1898) 
Observations 2722 1342 2720 2722 
Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient. . *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Marginal effects. Outcome variable is zero if tolerances were reduced, one if they were unchanged, and 
two if they were increased. 
 
 Since the public’s concern about pesticides may be driven by population 
exposure, particularly dietary risk, I also investigate the relationship between 
tolerance changes and news articles in Table 53. Only Post articles are significantly 
predictive of tolerance changes. A mention in a Post article is more likely to result in 






Table 53: Tolerance changes and media mentions 
(ordered probit) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








     
USA Today dummy 0.00808 0.00755   
 (0.307) (0.291)   
     







     
Log population risk  -0.0569***    
  (0.0170)   
     
Washington Post 
articles 
  -0.0508**  
(0.0188) 
 
     
USA Today articles   0.0180  
   (0.110)  
     
New York Times 
articles 
  0.0252 
(0.0217) 
 
     
Any article    -0.294 
    (0.170) 
cut1     
Constant -1.251***  -1.087***  -1.166***  -1.255***  
 (0.131) (0.147) (0.159) (0.133) 
cut2     
Constant 1.202***  1.385***  1.290***  1.196***  
 (0.137) (0.168) (0.123) (0.135) 
Observations 1163 1117 1163 1163 
Standard errors in parentheses. Conditional on reregist ation. Outcome variable is zero if tolerance was 
reduced, one if it was unchanged, and two if it wasincreased. 
* p < 0.05, **  p < 0.01, ***  p < 0.001 
 
 
Treatment of Minor Uses in the Reregistration Process 
 There is little evidence that minor uses were cancelled disproportionately. 
Minor crops had a slightly higher reregistration rate than major crops (81.5% vs. 
80.3%).  The regression results in Table 54 do not suggest a strong association 
between minor crops and probability of reregistration; the largest coefficient, in 




and the reduction in sample size. Indeed, the coefficient on Expenditures missing in 
Model 3 suggests that the important factor is that expenditure data is available more 
often for large crops than for minor crops. Crops with less acreage could generally 
have higher concentrations of pesticides, making dietary risk more relevant. 
Controlling for dietary risk in Model 4, however, has little effect on the Minor use 
coefficient.   
Table 54: Reregistration decisions and minor use 
crops 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Minor use 0.0122 0.0649* 0.0446 0.0266 
 (0.0310) (0.0352) (0.0314) (0.0259) 
Log of pesticide expenditures  0.0422*** 0.0441***  
  (0.00984) (0.0111)  
Expenditures missing   -0.0977**  
   (0.0425)  
Log of population risk    -0.0137 
    (0.00925) 
Constant 0.8529*** 1.1116*** 1.1400*** 0.7583*** 
 (0.1341) (0.1589) (0.1616) (0.1670) 
     
Observations 2722 708 2722 1342 
Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Marginal effects. Minor crops exclude almonds, apples, barley, snap beans, canola, corn, sweet corn, 
popcorn, cotton, grapes, oats, oranges, peanuts, pecans, potatoes, rice, rye, soybeans, sugarbeets, 
sugarcane, sunflower, tomatoes, and wheat. Outcome variable is one if the pesticide use was 
reregistered, and zero if it was cancelled. 
 
 
 Though the EPA’s mandate on which crops were minor crops was very clear, 
it seems appropriate to extend the analysis to a continuous measure of crop acreage. 
Table 55 presents results using log of average acres planted. As acreage increases, 
probability of reregistration decreases, though this result is not significant. Including 
a squared term allows for the possibility that very large crops are treated differently 




coefficients on log of acres planted and quartiles of acres planted (also not presented 
here). 
Table 55: Reregistration decisions and average acres 
planted 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Log of average acres planted  -0.00005 -0.0140 -0.0079 -0.0027 
 (0.0062) (0.0094) (0.0065) (0.0062) 
Log of pesticide expenditures  0.0428*** 0.0444***  
  (0.0098) (0.0108)  
Expenditures missing   -0.1065**  
   (0.0458)  
Log population risk    -0.0161** 
    (0.0089) 
Constant 0.8636*** 1.6050*** 1.3973*** 0.8780*** 
 (0.2260) (0.3803) (0.2752) (0.2637) 
     
Observations 2035 684 2035 1174 
Marginal effects. Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Coefficients for quartiles for average acres are also insignificant and are not reported here. 
Outcome variable is one if the pesticide use was reregistered, and zero if it was cancelled. 
 
Success of Registrants and Effect of New Active Ingredients in the Pipeline 
 To analyze the effect of individual pesticide registrants on the decision 
process, dummy variables for each of the major pesticide registrants are included in 
the models in Table 56. Not included in Table 56 is Monsanto, which had 100% 
success in registering pesticide uses included in the dataset. Of all the includ d 
registrants, only Dow has a significant coefficient—it was 14% more likely to have a 
successful pesticide reregistration. Dow is significant when controlling for dietary 
risk and pesticide expenditures, except when observations are limited by the inclusion 
of Log of pesticide expenditures. Though this result suggests that Dow held some 




dietary risk, it must be interpreted with caution. The intrinsic characteristics and 
history of individual pesticides are not captured in these models, which could bias the 
results. In addition, each of these registrant dummies varies only by active ingredient, 
meaning that the results of one or two successful active ingredients (with many uses) 
can have a big effect.  
If a registrant has a similar active ingredient in its development pipeline to th
pesticide under review, it may not have incentive to pursue the reregistration. I test 
for this possibility in Table 56, Model 5. The variable Pipeline active ingredient 
indicates that a similar pesticide was introduced to the market during the 





Table 56: Reregistration decisions, registrants, and 
new active ingredients 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
      
Log of pesticide expenditures  0.0372*** 0.0376*** 0.0214** 0.0369*** 
  (0.00954) (0.0114) (0.0085) (0.0113) 
Log population risk    -0.0058  
    (0.0089)  
Du Pont -0.0735 -0.0871 -0.0781 -0.216 -0.0865 
 (0.201) (0.203) (0.202) (0.247) (0.206) 
Dow 0.143*** 0.0482 0.136*** 0.129*** 0.136*** 
 (0.0533) (0.0836) (0.0529) (0.0428) (0.0527) 
Syngenta 0.0943 0.0289 0.0897 0.0458 0.0684 
 (0.0699) (0.0887) (0.0673) (0.0615) (0.0771) 
BASF 0.00515 0.0101 -0.0003 0.0226 -0.0114 
 (0.118) (0.0957) (0.120) (0.0932) (0.123) 
Bayer -0.199 -0.128 -0.196 -0.256 -0.204 
 (0.155) (0.150) (0.156) (0.163) (0.158) 
Expenditures missing   -0.0628 -0.0390 -0.0564 
   (0.0400) (0.0330) (0.0404) 
Pipeline active ingredient     0.0727 
     (0.0737) 
Constant 0.960*** 1.259*** 1.227*** 1.373*** 1.202** 
 (0.202) (0.213) (0.194) (0.293) (0.194) 
      
Observations 2722 708 2722 1342 2722 
Robust standard errors clustered by active ingredient.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Marginal effects. All Monsanto uses were reregistered. Monsanto predicts the outcome perfectly and is 
omitted from the model. Outcome variable is one if the pesticide use was reregistered, and zero if it 
was cancelled. 
 
Table 57 displays the effects of registrant dummies on tolerance change. Since 
these models are conditional on pesticide reregistration, Monsanto’s uses can be 
observed. Monsanto has the only significant coefficients of the registrants included, 
and the positive coefficient indicates that the tolerances on its pesticide uses tnd d o 
rise (become less restrictive).  
Interestingly, the coefficient on log of population risk in Model 4 is only 




“reasonable certainty of no harm” standard, which would not be affected by 
consideration of pesticide benefits. The coefficient on dietary risk is not robust t  the 
inclusion of registrant dummies, however. There are several possibilities. One is that 
dietary risk is unevenly distributed among the registrants’ portfolios of active 
ingredients, meaning that the variation between these portfolios is picking up the 
variation in dietary risk. A second possibility is that pesticide registrants are treated 
differently by the EPA, dietary risk notwithstanding.  
Table 58 demonstrates that the pesticide portfolios of the registrants vary a 
great deal: Monsanto has both the lowest average risk and the highest expenditure 
values for its pesticides, due to the fact that the vast majority of Monsanto’s uses in 
the dataset are of glyphosate.28 Interaction terms between the registrant dummies and 
dietary risk are not significant, which also does not suggest that some registrants had 
preferential treatment regardless of risk. A Wald test does reject the null hypothesis 
that the interaction terms are jointly equal to zero, however. 
 
 
                                                
28 Glyphosate is one of the most widely used pesticides, both in terms of pounds applied and number of 





Table 57: Tolerance changes and pesticide registrants 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
      
Du Pont 0.110 0.466 0.106 0.112 0.0590 
 (0.317) (0.281) (0.312) (0.299) (0.454) 
BASF 0.563 0.378 0.548 0.617 0.496 
 (0.354) (0.400) (0.358) (0.350) (0.401) 
Monsanto 0.785***  1.047***  0.782***  0.676***  1.066**  
 (0.174) (0.191) (0.172) (0.169) (0.345) 
Dow 0.212 0.130 0.207 0.0661 0.387 
 (0.188) (0.258) (0.187) (0.187) (0.478) 
Syngenta -0.218 -0.0855 -0.222 -0.186 -0.494 
 (0.425) (0.380) (0.426) (0.412) (0.453) 
Bayer -0.169 -0.197 -0.163 -0.0331 0.0301 
 (0.220) (0.213) (0.222) (0.285) (0.274) 














Log population risk    -0.0547* -0.0629 
    (0.0219) (0.0365) 
Du Pont*Log Population Risk     -0.0199 
(0.0805) 
BASF*Log Population Risk     -0.0856  
(0.0602) 
Monsanto*Log Population Risk     0.0672  
(0.0448) 
Dow*Log Population Risk     0.0643  
(0.0713) 
Syngenta*Log Population Risk     -0.105  
(0.0854) 
Bayer*Log Population Risk     0.0730  
(0.0396) 
      
cut1      
Constant -1.040***  -0.980***  -1.102***  -0.957***  -0.927***  
 (0.208) (0.203) (0.223) (0.233) (0.274) 
cut2      
Constant 1.464***  1.330***  1.404***  1.557***  1.616***  
 (0.146) (0.159) (0.154) (0.184) (0.213) 
Observations 1163 455 1163 1117 1117 
Standard errors in parentheses. Conditional on reregist ation. Outcome variable is zero if tolerance was 





Table 58: Population risk and pesticide expenditures 
by registrant 
 Population Risk Pesticide Expenditures 
Registrant N mean s.d. median N mean s.d. Median 
BASF 90 2.123 5.315 0.435 70 2.953 10.047 0.408 
Bayer 257 14.899 65.858 0.406 91 1.723 5.121 0.167 
Dow 138 0.134 0.902 0.005 76 6.314 22.710 0.800 
DuPont 151 0.393 1.429 0.040 85 2.778 10.418 0.345 
Monsanto 61 0.008 0.018 0.002 31 13.052 39.671 1.301 
Syngenta 79 2.493 7.494 0.051 49 1.686 3.438 0.243 
 
 In addition to their interest in influencing reregistration decisions and 
tolerance changes, registrants may have benefited from delaying reregistration 
decisions. In Table 59, I test whether the timing of the decision was sensitive to he 
expenditures on pesticides. As REDs included decisions for all uses of an active 
ingredient, the duration model is restricted to one observation per active ingrediet, 
and time is recorded as the number of years from the first RED in the sample. The 
coefficient on total expenditure (the sum of expenditure over all the values of an 
active ingredient) is not significantly different than zero, nor is the coeffi ient on log 
of reference dose. I have no evidence, therefore, that the value of the pesticide 




Table 59: Expenditure levels and time to RED 
publication 
 (1) (2) 
   
   
Log of reference dose  -0.0476 
  (0.0447) 




   
   
Observations 92 92 
Cox proportional hazards model. Standard errors in parentheses. Duration is measured in years, where 
Year 0 is the first year a RED was published that appe rs in the dataset. Because REDs are specific to 
active ingredients, not to crops, data is collapsed to the active ingredient level, and total expenditure is 
the sum of expenditures over all crops for an active ingredient. Reference dose is a benchmark for the 
toxicity of the active ingredient. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Conclusion 
Several factors that may have influenced the outcomes of reregistration do not appear 
to be important. News articles, which may approximate the level of public interest in 
particular pesticide, apparently had little bearing on the process. Coefficients on 
media variables are generally insignificant and in some ways inconsistent. 
 Whether registrants would support minor uses in the reregistration process 
was a concern at the time that FQPA was passed. I find no evidence that minor uses 
were cancelled more often or that the size of the crop (measured by acres plant d) 
was a significant determinant of the EPA’s decisions. 
 Furthermore, having similar pesticides in the development pipeline had no 
significant effect on the reregistration of uses. Most registrant dummies also were 
insignificant, with the notable exception of Dow.  Dow was more likely to have a use 
reregistered than the other registrants.  Dow had uses that were relatively low risk and 




risk and pesticide expenditures are included.  Monsanto, which had 100% success in 
reregistration, was also 18% more likely to have its tolerances increased. 
Chapter 7:  Discussion and Conclusions  
Summary of research findings 
Do reregistration decisions appear to be protective of dietary risk to consumers?  
Regulatory decisions for pesticide uses seem to be protective of 
consumers, but only in certain ways. There is weak evidence that the EPA 
cancelled pesticide uses in response to dietary risk: a 10% increase in 
dietary risk would increase the probability of cancellation by well under 
1%, and these effects are only slightly significant.  
Pesticide expenditures are a highly significant predictor of 
reregistration outcomes, but it does not appear that expenditure levels 
interfered with the EPA’s assessment of dietary risk (which should have 
been evaluated independently). At the highest levels of expenditures, 
pesticide uses were more likely to be reregistered, but the EPA also was 
most responsive to dietary risk within that group. 
The EPA did seem to reduce dietary exposure through restricting 
pesticide tolerances. Dietary risk has a highly significant and negative 
effect on tolerance changes; a 1% increase in dietary risk implies a 1.3% 
increase in the probability of having the tolerance reduced. The EPA’s 
responsiveness to dietary risk in setting tolerances does not diminish at 




Data for cancer risks was weak, and though coefficients on cancer 
variables indicate that higher risks were associated with more cancellation 
and stricter tolerances, these coefficients are not generally significant.  
Are active ingredient and crop combinations with greater risks to children more 
likely to be cancelled?   
There is limited evidence that the EPA was particularly protective of the 
health of infants in children during the reregistration process. Several 
measures of infant and child risk do not have significant coefficients. The 
exception is for child and infant risk measures above a threshold of 
concern: above a certain level of risk, child and infant risk does appear to 
increase the probability of cancellation by approximately 10%. 
Do occupational hazards appear to be significant factors in reregistration outcomes? 
Several measures of occupational hazard did not have consistently 
significant relationships with reregistration decisions. The effect of 
occupational hazard does vary by level of expenditure, however, with low 
levels of expenditure having higher probabilities of cancellation and high 
levels of expenditure having lower probabilities of cancellation. This 
result is consistent with the EPA trading off the economic benefit of a 
pesticide with the occupational risk.  
 For reregistered pesticide uses, occupational hazards do have a 
significant effect on the reentry interval, suggesting that the EPA was 




 Similar to the analysis of dietary risk, there were not significant 
relationships between cancer risk for workers and regulatory outcomes. 
Are active ingredients more likely to be cancelled on small crops (measured in terms 
of acreage)?  
In spite of concerns about pesticide availability for minor crops following 
reregistration, minor crops were not cancelled at a higher rate than high-
acreage crops, and acreage is not a significant predictor of reregistration. 
To protect growers’ interests, the EPA could have also taken into account 
the availability and price of substitutes, as a regulatory change to one 
pesticide would have less impact if there were cheap alternatives. 
However, the effects of substitute availability and price were not 
consistent across specifications.  
Are some registrants more successful at reregistering pesticides than others? 
The highly significant effect of pesticide expenditures on reregistration 
suggests that pesticide registrants were successful at reregist in  high 
value active ingredients. Of the six major registrants, Dow and Monsanto 
were most likely to have their pesticide uses reregistered (Monsanto was 
successful for every use in the dataset.) Both companies had high-value 
and relatively low-risk pesticides under review, however, making it 
difficult to determine if their success was the result of their lobbying 
efforts or the result of the characteristics of their pesticide portfolios. 
Is there evidence that uses were cancelled when registrants were about to bring 




If a registrant anticipated the introduction of a comparable pesticide in the 
future, it might have saved the expense and effort of reregistration and 
simply cancelled the pesticide. There is no evidence, however, that uses 
were cancelled in anticipation of bringing substitute pesticides to the 
market. 
Did media coverage of pesticides appear to affect reregistration decisions? 
Media coverage had no significant effect on reregistration decisions after 
controlling for dietary risk. Of the news outlets analyzed, may drive 
greater public awareness of pesticide toxicity, and in turn, create 
additional public pressure for regulation.   
Researching the regulatory process 
Many economic analyses attempt to predict the outcomes of public policies or 
measure how a single regulatory change affects agent behavior or benefits. Th se are 
valuable lines of research. This thesis, however, examines public policy from a less-
viewed angle: does the regulatory process, at the agency level, produce the 
regulations that were intended in the original legislation? 
 This is an important link when attempting to understand the mechanisms and 
effects of public policy. To what extent can we trust that legislation will result in the 
intended outcomes, if we are not sure that it will result in the intended intermediate 
regulations?  Is public trust in agencies to represent their interests wll placed? This is 
a particularly salient question for pesticide regulation, as the public is continually 





 The analysis of regulation presented here illustrates some possibilities for 
research on regulatory outcomes, but also some challenges. The more complex the 
regulations or process, the more we might learn from close examination—and the 
more costly that close examination becomes. Significant effort was required not just 
to understand the regulatory environment, but also to recreate the set of information 
the agency was using. 
 In the case of pesticide reregistration, the EPA’s instructions from Congress 
on how to ensure the safety of pesticides were clear. The details of implementing this 
instruction, however, were complex: the EPA amassed large quantities of disparate 
data on pesticide effects and usage; its decisions attracted input from a variety of 
stakeholders, including registrants, growers, consumers, and environmental groups.  
Determinants of the EPA’s regulatory decisions on pesticides 
 
 The pesticide reregistration process was expensive. It took the EPA decades of 
work to publish reregistration decisions, and longer still to reregister individual 
pesticide products. Pesticide registrants spent significant resources to generate data to 
support reregistrations. The completion of reregistration does not mean the processis 
over: the EPA will continue to review pesticide products on a schedule. 
 The EPA did appear to respond to human health risks in making reregistration 
decisions. Though there was not a linear relationship between population dietary risk 
and reregistrations or applicator MOE and reregistrations, the data suggest that the 
EPA may have treated pesticide uses differently depending on whether they were 




directed by Congress to address dietary risk as well as with how the EPA describes its 
own regulatory processes.  
 There is significant evidence that the EPA relied more on mitigation measures 
rather than on the cancellation of pesticide uses to reduce risk. This may be a positive 
thing: cancellation is a firm reduction in pesticide options, and has economic 
consequences for growers and registrants. An overabundance of caution could do 
harm. 
 On the other hand, there may be more questions about the enforceability of the 
mitigation measures chosen by the EPA. The EPA sets tolerances, but does not 
enforce them; the FDA is responsible for that. Large scale screening of commodities 
for pesticide residues is expensive and impractical. 
 Increasing PPE and other equipment for agricultural workers significantly 
reduces exposure if used correctly. It is a key assumption on the part of the EPA that 
workers will understand and comply with pesticide label requirements. Monitoring 
how pesticides are mixed, loaded, and applied is a considerable task.   
 Perhaps just as interesting as the factors that significantly influenced EPA’s 
decisions were the factors that did not. Anticipation of new active ingredients, media
mentions of active ingredients, and individual registrants did not appear to have a big 
effect on the regulatory process.  Pesticide expenditures were a highly significant 
determinant of reregistration, but seemed to operate independently of population 






Appendix A: Data Sources 
 
Variable Units Source 
Reregistration outcome under FQPA Binary EPA Reregistration Eligibility 
Decisions (REDs) 
Pesticide tolerances, 1994 parts per million Code of Federal Regulations 
(40CFR180) 
Pesticide tolerances, 2009 parts per million Code of Federal Regulations 
(40CFR180) 
Reentry Intervals Days EPA Reregistration Eligibility 
Decisions (REDs) 
Price of AI millions of nominal U.S. 
dollars/pound 
NASS/Doane 
Acres treated (acre-treatments) Acres NASS/Doane 
Pounds of AI Pounds NASS/Doane 
Carcinogenicity category  “Chemicals Evaluated for 
Carcinogenic Potential by the 
Office of Pesticide Programs” 
Sept. 2009 
Lifetime cancer risk (q*)  EPA IRIS and REDs 
Chronic No Observed Adverse 
Effect Level (cNOAEL) 
mg/kg-day EPA 
Reference dose Mg/kg-day EPA Reregistration Eligibility 
Decisions (REDs), other EPA 
sources 
Inhalation toxicity Count EPA Reregistration Eligibility 
Decisions (REDs), Courbois 
(2000), other EPA sources 
Commodity consumption per capita grams per day Continui g Survey of Food 
Intakes by Individuals (CSFII) 
1994-1996 
Commodity consumption per capita, 
children 
grams per day CSFII 
Commodity consumption per capita, 
infants 




Variable Units Source 
Commodities commonly consumed 
by infants 
 National Academy of Sciences, 
Pesticides in the Diets of Infants 
and Children, 1993 
Commodities commonly consumed 
by children 
 National Academy of Sciences, 
Pesticides in the Diets of Infants 
and Children, 1993 
Maximum application rate pounds of active 
ingredient per acre 
EPA Reregistration Eligibility 
Decisions (REDs) 
Personal Protective Equipment, 
Applicators 
indicators for no PPE, 
gloves required, and 
additional PPE required 
EPA Reregistration Eligibility 
Decisions (REDs) 
Personal Protective Equipment, 
Mixer/loaders 
indicators for no PPE, 
gloves required, and 
additional PPE required 
EPA Reregistration Eligibility 
Decisions (REDs) 
Engineering controls required Binary EPA Reregistration Eligibility 
Decisions (REDs) 
Respirators required Binary EPA Reregistration Eligibility 
Decisions (REDs) 
Unit exposure Mg/lb PHED Surrogate Exposure 
Guide, 1998 
Acres per farm Acres USDA-NASS 1992 Agricultural 
Census 
Application rate lbs/acre USDA-ERS (NASS and Doane) 
Formulation  California Department of 
Pesticide Regulation, 1994 
Application method  California Department of 
Pesticide Regulation, 1994 
Acres per application  Acres California Department of 
Pesticide Regulation, 1994 
Pounds per application Pounds California Department of 
Pesticide Regulation, 1994 
Registrant dummies Binary EPA Reregistration Eligibility 
Decisions (REDs) 
Counts of news articles (Washington 
Post, New York Times, USAToday) 
Count coded from Lexis-Nexis searches 
Minor crop dummy Binary as specified in FQPA 
Pipeline active ingredient Binary recent pesticide registrations as 
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